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COMMENTS
WINNING THE BATTLE, BUT LOSING THE
WAR: PURPORTED AGE DISCRIMINATION
MAY DISCOURAGE EMPLOYERS FROM
PROVIDING RETIREE MEDICAL BENEFITS
CHRISTOPHER E. CONDELUCI*
It has been our policy to encourage employers to provide generous
employee benefits. Clearly, this objective is frustrated, if not
defeated, if Congress enacts legislation that so heavily encumbers
American companies that they must reduce or eliminate such
benefits .... we must be concerned about the impact on all
employees of additional Federal requirements that unnecessarily
complicate existing arrangements or that will shift a firm's
resources from actual benefits into regulatory compliance or
litigation. If an employer is forced to reduce or eliminate benefits for
some workers to avoid litigation exposure or to avoid going afoul of
the law, we have to ask the question: Is it worth it?1
INTRODUCTION
The employer-sponsored health benefit system in the United

Christopher E. Condeluci is currently a Joint J.D.ILL.M. candidate in The
John Marshall Law School's LL.M. Program in Employee Benefits Law. Prior
to entering law school, Christopher worked for Congressman Richard R.
Chrysler (R-MI) where he focused on Social Security and pension issues. He
moved on to work as a fundraising assistant for the 1997 Republican SenateHouse Dinner. Christopher later worked as the Congressional Liaison for
Americans Discuss Social Security, a non-profit organization focusing
exclusively on Social Security reform issues, and Government Relations
Specialist for Towers Perrin, a pension and benefits consulting firm. While
attending The John Marshall Law School, Christopher worked as a voluntary
extern for the Internal Revenue Service, Office of Chief Counsel, Tax
Exempt/Government Entity Division. He also worked as a Summer Associate
for Silverstein and Mullens, a division of Buchanan Ingersoll in Washington,
DC, and interned at the United States Department of the Treasury, Office of
Tax Policy, Benefits Tax Counsel.
1. 136 CONG. REC. S13,594, S13,600 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) (statement
of Sen. Hatch).
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States is voluntary.2 Congress enacted the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 19743 ("ERISA") to provide protection for
plan participants and "to prescribe a uniform set of requirements
for employers in the voluntary delivery of such benefits."
In
addition to ERISA, several federal laws affect the design of
employer-provided benefits including the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 19675 ("ADEA") as amended by the Older
2. Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit
Claim Cases, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2001); see also 120 CONG. REC.
S29,942, S29,942 (statement of Sen. Javits) (stating that the purpose of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), enacted in 1974, was "to
maintain the voluntary growth of private [pension and employee benefit] plans
while ...making needed structural reforms in such areas as vesting, funding,
termination, etc. so as to safeguard workers against loss of their earned or
anticipated benefits... ."). See also Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption
and Regulation of Managed Health Care: The Case for Managed Federalism,
23 AM. J. L. & MED. 251, 251 (1997) (stating that ERISA was enacted to
maintain the voluntary growth of employee benefit plans); see also United
States General Accounting Office, Retiree Health Insurance:Erosion in Retiree
Health Benefits Offered by Large Employers: Testimony Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight, Comm. on Ways and Means House of Representatives, 105th
Cong. Pub. No. GAO/T-HEHS-98-110, 10 (1998) (statement of William J.
Scanlon, Director Health Financing and Systems Issues Health, Education,
and Human Services Division)[hereinafter GAO Testimony I] available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&
filename=he98110t.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao (last visited Aug. 23,
2002); see generally Dana M. Muir, From YUPPIES to GUPPIES: Unfunded
Mandates and Benefit Plan Regulation, 34 GA. L. REV. 195 (1999).
3. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et.
seq. and amended in various sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.). ERISA is the
federal labor law, together with I.R.C. § 401 (1994 & Supp. III 1997), which
regulates the adoption and maintenance of voluntary employer-sponsored
retirement and welfare plans. ERISA's provisions were codified in Title 29 of
the United States Code, whereas the related tax provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code were codified in Title 26 of the United States Code. Kennedy,
supra note 2, at 1084 n.1.
4. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1084.
Protection of interstate commerce and beneficiaries by requiring
disclosure and reporting, setting standards of conduct, etc., for
fiduciaries. It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to
protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the
disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial
and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of
conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit
plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready
access to the Federal courts.
ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
5. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 621 et.
seq.). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), enacted in 1967,
has been amended by subsequent sessions of Congress. See, e.g., Kerry A.
Brennan, Note, Early Retirement Incentives: "Golden Handshake" for Some,
Age Discriminationfor Others, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 927, 929 n.9 (1988) (listing
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Workers Benefit Protection Act of 19906 ("OWBPA").
The ADEA creates a protected class consisting of workers that
are age forty and older.7 Specifically, the ADEA, as amended by
the OWBPA, prohibits employers from providing fewer benefits
because of an individual's age.8 Although ERISA prescribes a
uniform set of minimum rules for providing health benefits,
ERISA did not contemplate retiree medical benefits9 at the time of
its enactment.'0
Instead, as health benefits were used by

the amendments as: "Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 74 (1974); Pub. L. No. 95256, 92 Stat. 189-93 (1978); Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 353 (1982); Pub. L.
No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1063 (1984); Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat. 1792 (1984);

Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (1986).").
6. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, 626, 629, 630); see Older Worker Benefit Protection Act
("OWBPA") § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 630(1) (2000). "The term 'compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment' encompasses all employee benefits,
including such benefits provided pursuant to a bona fide employee benefit
plan." Id.; see also S. REP. No. 101-263, at 16 (1990). "Through this
legislation, Congress intends to make unmistakably clear that the ADEA's
purpose of eliminating arbitrary age discrimination in employment includes
the elimination of age discrimination in all forms of employee benefits." Id.
7. ADEA § 12(a), 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)(2000). "The prohibitions in this
chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least forty years of age." Id.
8. See 135 CONG. REC. S9948, S9950 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of
Sen. Metzenbaum). See also PLAN SPONSOR.COM, EEOC Reviewing Policy on
Retiree Health Benefits, July 25, 2001, at http://www.plansponsor.com/eprise/
main/PlanSponsor/News/Rules/eeoceriereview.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2002)
(stating that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ADEA applied to
employers who provided unequal benefits).
9. Retiree medical health benefits are provided to retired employees in a
similar manner as health benefits are provided to active employees. There are
several approaches employers can take in providing retiree medical benefits.
Id. For example, the medical benefits a retiree receives may depend upon the
retiree's age, length of service with the employer, and the year in which the
employee retired. Id. Additionally, benefits can be provided on a cost-sharing
basis where both the employer and the retiree contribute toward health
insurance premiums. Id. Several retiree medical benefit programs are
provided through health maintenance organizations or traditional indemnity
plans. Id. The purpose of providing such benefits is to allow retirees the
opportunity to receive affordable health benefits up until the time Medicare
benefits become available, i.e., when the retiree reaches age sixty-five. Id. To
be eligible for retiree medical benefits, a retiree must have been a "regular"
employee at the time of his or her retirement. See generally THE SEGAL
COMPANY, Benefits to Balance Your Personal and Professional Lives: Retiree
Medical Benefits, at http://www.segalco.com/careers/benefits.html (last visited
Aug. 20, 2002); Richard H. Herchenroether, Medical Expenses Insurance:
Simpler and Better, BENEFITSLINK.COM, 1998, at http://www.benefitslink.coml
articles/msa.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2002); Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institution, Human Resources Office, Retiree Medical Benefits, Mar. 1, 2001,
available at http://www.whoi.edu/services/HR/retireme/med.htm (last visited
Aug. 20, 2002).
10. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
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employers to attract and retain employees, employers increasingly
began providing such incentives."

The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any
plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established
or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by
both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or
is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their
beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A)
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers,
scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described
in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions on retirement or
death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
Id.
11. United States General Accounting Office, Retiree Health Insurance:
Gaps in Coverage and Availability, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on
Employer-Employee Relations, Comm. on Education and the Workforce House
of Representatives, 107th Cong. Pub. No. GAO-02, 178T, 3 (2001) (statement of
William J. Scanlon, Director, Health Care Issues) [hereinafter GAO Testimony
II available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress
= 162.140.64.21&filename=d02178t.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao
(last
visited Aug. 23, 2002).
Since World War II, many employers have voluntarily sponsored
health insurance as a benefit to employees for purposes of recruitment
and retention, and many have also extended these benefits to their
retirees. The federal tax code gives employers incentives to subsidize
health benefits because their contributions can be deducted as a
business expense, and these contributions are also not considered
taxable income for employees.
Id.
In addition to providing retiree medical benefits in hopes of attracting and
retaining employees, many employers today are providing such benefits as
incentives to encourage older employees to leave active employment with their
respective employer. David M. Katz, Medical, Dental, Prescription Drugs:
Ain't Retirement Grand? Eager to get workers off the payroll, employers
consider boosting retirement benefits, CFO.COM, Nov. 5, 2001, at
http://www.cfo.com/Article?article=5181 (last visited Aug. 20, 2002). Thus,
"the approach to losing workers is the same as it was for retaining workers."
Id. Employers are beginning to offer "attractive" benefits to downsize their
workforce. Id. "As some employers have discovered, better retiree health-care
coverage can be particularly attractive to workers in their mid to late 50s." Id.
Because workers in their 50s traditionally want to retire, and likewise because
employers have traditionally found it to be in their best interests to encourage
early retirement, employers have sought to provide additional benefits in
hopes of incentivizing early retirement. Id. But those employees opting to
take advantage of early retirement find themselves in a position where they
are well short of receiving Medicare benefits. Id. In order to bridge the gap
between early retirement and the receipt of Medicare benefits upon reaching
the age of sixty-five, employers have sought to provide generous retiree
medical benefits as an incentive to leave employment. Id. Such employers,
however, subsequently terminate or reduce those benefits when the retiree
reaches Medicare-eligibility. Id.

20021

Age DiscriminationMay DiscourageRetiree Benefits

Today, retiree medical benefits are arguably one of the most
valued benefits an employee can receive from his or her
employer. 12 Providing affordable health care for retirees is an
important social policy issue.13 With the baby boom generation
looming on the verge of retirement, retiree medical benefits are
becoming increasingly important.14 Thus, Congress and the courts
should encourage employers to provide their employees with
retiree medical benefits. Congress consistently attempts to strike
a balance between regulating employee benefit plans and
encouraging employers to provide such benefits. 5 The courts, on
the other hand, often interpret federal statutes in a manner that
valuable employee
discourages employers from providing these
16
benefits, contrary to Congressional intent.
In August 2000, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in
Erie County Retirees Assoc. v. County of Erie, Penn. 7 that a retiree
medical benefit plan violated the ADEA because the plan failed to
give older retirees 8 the same health benefit choice as younger
retirees. 9 Specifically, active employees and non-Medicare-eligible

12. Telephone Interview with Mary Lou Dixon, plan participant, Shaler

Area School District Retiree Medical Benefit Plan (Aug. 15, 2001).
13. See 136 CONG. REC. S13,594, S13,600 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Hatch). "Many employers continue health benefits for
persons who retire before they are eligible for Medicare and/or continue
certain benefits that are supplemental to Medicare. This is a positive practice
which helps provide important protections for retirees .... [that] are vital to
retirees of all ages." Id.
14. Employers recognize the importance of retaining an experienced
workforce, while at the same time, struggle with their increased medical
coverage. GAO Testimony I, supra note 2, at 3. The decision of when to retire
often turns on the availability of employers continuing to provide benefits. Id.
15. See, e.g., Opening Statement of Chairman Johnson, Hearing on
Retirement Security for the American Worker: Opportunities and Challenges
Before the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations Committee on
Education and the Workforce, House of Representatives, 107th Cong. (Nov. 1,
2001) (statement of the Honorable Sam Johnson (R-TX), Chairman, Subcomm.
on Employer-Employee Relations) available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/
hearings/107th/eer/retireell00ll/osjohnson.htm (last visited July 11, 2002).
"As all the members know and understand, retiree health coverage provided
by employers under ERISA is a voluntary undertaking by employers. We
should not do anything that would cause this coverage to be withdrawn due to
higher costs or complicated Federal governmental policy (emphasis
added)." Id.
16. See generally, Erie County Retirees Assoc. v. County of Erie, Penn.,
220 F.3d 193 (3rd Cir. 2000).
17. 220 F.3d 193 (3rd Cir. 2000).
18. "Older retirees" are retirees age sixty-five or older and Medicare
eligible.
19. "Younger retirees" are retirees below the age of sixty-five and
traditionally not yet eligible for Medicare. See Erie County, 220 F.3d at 217
(holding that the retiree class "established a claim under [§ 4(a)(1) of the
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retirees were given the opportunity to choose between a point-ofservice 20 ("PSO") health plan and a health maintenance
organization" ("HMO"), but retirees eligible for Medicare22 were
only offered the HMO."2 The Third Circuit held that benefits
available to Medicare-eligible retirees under the HMO provided
less benefits than those available to active and non-Medicareeligible retirees, thus violating the ADEA. 4 Structuring retiree
medical benefits in such a manner, however, is a relatively
common practice among employers.25
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
has jurisdiction over the ADEA. 6 In October 2000, two months
after the Erie County decision, the EEOC adopted the Third
Circuit's decision in its enforcement guidelines.27 Specifically

ADEA] because they [were] treated differently in their 'compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of... age,'" but noting that
"the safe harbor provided under [§ 4(f)(2)(B)(i) of the ADEA] [may be]
applicable if the County [could] meet the equal benefit or equal cost
standard").
20. A PSO health plan combines the features of an Health Maintenance
Organization ("HMO") and a traditional indemnity plan. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 235
n.1 (5th ed. 1997). A POS plan, "isan [HMO] organization in which the
patients are prepaid enrollees who may receive services from providers who
are not members of the HMO's panel." Id.
21. "[An] (HMO) is an organization that offers prepaid, comprehensive
health coverage for both hospital and physician services. Members are
required to use participating providers and are enrolled for specified periods of
time." Id.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000).
Every individual who- (1) is entitled to hospital insurance benefits
under part A, of this subchapter or (2) has attained age 65 and is a
resident of the United States, and is either (A) a citizen or (B) an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence who has resided in the
United States continuously during the 5 years immediately preceding
the month in which he applies for enrollment under this part, is eligible
to enroll in the insurance program established by this part.
Id.
23. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 197-98.
24. Id. at 217.
25. GAO Testimony I, supra note 2, at 6; see also GROOM LAW GROUP,
Third Circuit Questions Legality of Retiree Health Plans That Provide
Different Medical Benefits to Pre-Medicare Retirees and Medicare-Eligible
Retirees, Aug. 30, 2000, at 3, available at http://www.americanbenefitscouncil
.org/documents/adeadecisionmemo.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2002) (stating that
many companies institute policies that grant different levels of health care
benefits to eligible Medicare employees and non-eligible Medicare employees);
Brief of Amici Curiae, The ERISA Industry Committee in Support of
Petitioner at 11, County of Erie, Penn. v. Erie County Retirees Assoc., 121 S.
Ct. 1247 (2001) (No. 00-906).
26. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 626 (2000).
27.

EQUAL
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citing Erie County, the EEOC "assert[ed] that employers may not
reduce or eliminate retiree health benefits when a retiree becomes
eligible for Medicare ....
,2 The EEOC contended that if an
employer eliminated coverage for retirees when they were eligible
for Medicare, or if the employer did not offer equitable benefit
coverage to older and younger retirees, older retirees would receive
less ADEA
coverage
than younger retirees because of their age, which the
• •29
ADEA prohibits.
The ruling in Erie County can best be described as retirees
winning the battle, but losing the war, because the decision,
especially for retirees in the Third Circuit, threatens the
availability of retiree medical benefit programs. 0 As a result,
employers may choose to eliminate these programs entirely, rather
than risk violating a federal discrimination law. 1 Because there is
no requirement for employers to provide retiree medical benefits,32
significant increases in the cost of benefits and administration
have already caused employers to reconsider the scope and

MANUAL, § 3 Employee Benefits
EEOC MANUAL].

917212 5807-5807-3 (2002). [hereinafter

Benefits will not be equal, on the other hand, where a plan sets a
specific, age-based cutoff for the length of time employees can receive
payments ....Moreover, benefits will not be equal where a plan reduces
or eliminates benefits based on a criterion that is explicitly defined (in
whole or in part) by age... Example: employer B provides health
insurance for its retirees but eliminates that coverage once the retirees
become eligible for old-age benefits under Medicare. Because eligibility
for these Medicare benefits is tied to age, employer B's plan treats
retirees differently on the basis of age.
Id.
28. Id. at % 7214 5817; see also WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE, Court
Ruling Threatens Employer-Sponsored Retiree Medical Benefits, June 2001, at
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/us/pubs/insider/showarticle.asp?ArticlelD=9145
&Component=The+Insider (last visited Aug. 21, 2002).
29. Jerry Geisel, EEOC Enforcement of Erie Case on Hold, BUS. INS., July
30, 2001, at 1.
30. See QUARLES & BRADY, LLP, Practical Guide to Employment
Relations: Does Your Retiree Health Plan Violate the ADEA, Jan. 2001, Issue
30, available at http://www.quarles.com/up-pral3.asp (last visited Aug. 20,
2002)
31. See WIMBERLY, LAWSON, STECKEL, NELSON & SCHNEIDER, P.C.,
Lower Benefits for Older Retirees May Violate Age Discrimination Law,
Volume XXI, Issue 10, Oct. 2000, available at http://www.wimlaw.com/
news-oct00.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2002) (providing that "the elimination of
benefits, or reduction of coverage, upon a participant's eligibility for Medicare
has been a relatively common feature of retiree medical programs").
32. See GAO Testimony I, supra note 2, at 10-11 (stating that "[n]othing in
federal law prevents an employer from cutting or eliminating health benefits.
In fact, an employer's freedom to modify the conditions of coverage or to
terminate health coverage is a defining characteristic of America's voluntary,
employer-based system of health insurance.").
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availability of their retiree medical programs." With the added
threat of liability under age discrimination laws, employers may
"throw their hands in the air," and terminate benefits altogether.
Such extreme cases were never contemplated, nor are they
acceptable to Members of Congress in the regulation of the
completely voluntary, employer-provided, employee benefits
system.34 Therefore, is Erie County good law?
On August 17, 2001, by a unanimous vote, the EEOC
temporarily abandoned the Erie County court's holding by
officially rescinding their current interpretation of how the ADEA
applies to retiree medical benefit plans.35 The EEOC announced
that it would begin reviewing its policy "concerning the application
of the [ADEA] to employer-sponsored retiree health benefit plans,
such as those offering extended health care coverage in the form of
a Medicare bridge," (i.e. coverage until Medicare eligibility at age
sixty-five).36
Commission Vice Chair Paul M. Igasaki
acknowledged that the EEOC "must carefully craft a policy which
protects the rights of older retirees but does not deter employers
from providing health benefits to retirees in general."37 Despite
the EEOC's temporary shift in policy, however, the Erie County
decision is still valid legal precedent that enables retirees to bring
suit against their former employers.38
Part I of this Comment discusses the Erie County holding,
facts, and rationale. Specifically, Part I focuses on the Third
Circuit's application of the ADEA to retirees. Part II examines the
Third Circuit's reasoning that lead to the conclusion that the
ADEA applied to retirees. Part II also asserts that "retirees"
should not be considered "individuals" for the purposes of the
ADEA, and criticizes the Third Circuit for concluding that section

33. Paul Fronstin, Retiree Health Benefits: Trends and Outlook, EBRI
IssuE BRIEF NUMBER 236, Aug. 2001, at 7, 9 [hereinafter EBRI REPORT].
34. See supra note 1. (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also 136 CONG. REC.
S13,253, S13,254 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kassenbaum)
(stating that "[wie should be encouraging employers to offer benefit programs
to workers, not discouraging or eliminating popular beneficial employee
benefit programs").

35. Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Rescinds Guidance; Will Review Policy
on Retiree Health Benefits (Aug. 20, 2001) at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/8-20O1.html) (last visited Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter EEOC Press Release].

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See GROOM LAW GROUP, EEOC Rescinds, Aug. 29, 2001,

at,

http://www.groom.com/articles-display.asp?display=107 (last visited Aug. 1,
2002).

"The Commission's action does not eliminate the risk of liability

associated with Medicare-based benefit differentials in retiree health plans.
The Erie County decision itself remains controlling precedent within the Third
Circuit (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and the Virgin Islands).

Interested parties likely will continue to press for more definitive comfort." Id.
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4(a)(1) of the ADEA protects "retirees." Part III examines the
district court's initial holding and rationale in Erie County. Part
III also provides an analysis of the OWBPA's legislative history,
illustrating that statements made by Members of Congress
provide a clear and unambiguous intent that the ADEA should not
apply to retirees. Part III concludes by examining the Third
Circuit's reliance on the EEOC and portions of the OWBPA's
legislative history, and contends that such reliance is
contradictory and inconsistent with established precedent. Part
IV explores the EEOC's policy with regard to the ADEA and
retirees and examines the principles associated with the equal
benefit or equal cost safe harbor.39 Part IV also discusses the
district court's application of the equal benefit or equal cost safe
harbor as directed by the Third Circuit, and argues that the Erie
County decision as a whole will result in the elimination of retiree
medical programs. Finally, Part V proposes that other circuits
should not follow the Erie County decision and that Congress, the
courts, and the EEOC should recognize that the ADEA is
inapplicable to retirees. Part V concludes by proposing various
legislative and regulatory changes to the ADEA and the equal
benefit or equal cost safe harbor.
Background of the Law
ERISA provides rules and requirements regulating the
voluntary delivery of benefits to employees." The ADEA prohibits
age discrimination by providing that "an employer... [cannot]
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age."" The OWBPA resurrected one of
the ADEA's original
purposes-the
elimination of age
discrimination in employee benefits.4" In order to restore this
purpose, the OWBPA specifically defined the term "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in the ADEA to
include "all employee benefits." 3 Thus, the ADEA, as amended by
39. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (2000).

40. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. (2000).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000). "It shall be unlawful for an employer-(1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." Id.
42. S. REP. No. 101-263, at 15 (1990). The "Findings" in the OWBPA
provides that "legislative action is necessary to restore the original
congressional intent in passing and amending the ADEA, which was to
prohibit discrimination against older workers in all employee benefits except
when age-based reductions in employee benefit plans are justified by
significant cost considerations." See OWBPA § 101.
43. OWBPA § 102; 29 U.S.C. § 630(1) (2000); S. REP. NO. 101-263, at 16
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the OWBPA, "prohibit[s] discrimination against older workers in
all employee benefits except when age-based reductions in
employee benefit plans are justified by significant cost
considerations.""
One of the original purposes underlying the enactment of the
OWBPA was to expressly overrule Public Employees Retirement
System of Ohio v. Betts,4 wherein the Supreme Court eliminated

the ADEA's protections against discrimination in employee
benefits." In Betts, 7 the Supreme Court held that the ADEA

(1990) (emphasis added).
44. S. REP. No. 101-263, at 15 (1990).
The bill restores the bipartisan pre-Betts understanding of the employee
benefit provisions of the ADEA... by reaffirming the 'equal benefit or
equal cost' principle ... a principle that reflects common sense as well
as Congressional intent .... Because age-related cost differences do exist
for some benefits (such as life insurance or disability), employers who
demonstrate such a cost differential may comply with the ADEA by
expending equal amounts for the benefit per employee. This "equal
benefit or equal cost" rule is fair to employees because it encourages
employers to provide equal benefits for older workers. It also is fair to
employers because it gives them the flexibility to provide unequal
benefits if they have sufficient age-based cost justifications.
136 CONG. REC. S13,236, S13,242-43 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1990) (Summary of
the OWBPA).
45. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
In this case the slim conservative majority interpreted the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 [ADEA] as providing little or
no protection for older workers from discrimination in employee benefit
plans. The original intent of Congress in passing and amending the
ADEA was to prohibit discrimination against older workers in all
employee benefits except when age-based reductions in employee benefit
plans are justified by significant cost considerations. The EEOC under
the Reagan administration had vigorously litigated to defend this very
interpretation of the act.
137 CONG. REC. S14,512, S14,514 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Jeffords).
46. Public Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
47. Betts, 492 U.S. at 163. June Betts was a public employee in Ohio. Id.
At age sixty-one she became permanently and seriously disabled and had no
choice but to retire. Id. Ohio's Public Employee Retirement System (PERS),
enacted in 1933, provided for basic retirement and disability retirement. Id.
Disability retirement was limited to employees sixty and under. Id. Betts was
not allowed to take disability retirement because she was over sixty, and
therefore forced to settle for basic retirement benefits. Id. She filed suit in
Federal court contending that the plan discriminated against older workers in
violation of the ADEA. Id. at 164. Applying the EEOC's equal benefit or equal
cost test, the district court held in favor of Betts, finding the PERS did not
satisfy section 4(f)(2)'s exception to the ADEA. Id. The Sixth Circuit
subsequently affirmed the district court's decision. Id. at 164-65. The
Supreme Court, however, rejected this long-standing and accepted
interpretation of section 4(f)(2), and instead adopted a "plain meaning"
approach to the term "subterfuge." Id. at 168. The Court held that a post-
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permitted age discrimination in employee benefit plans.48
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that an employer need not
demonstrate a legitimate cost justification in order to deny
employee benefits based on age." The decision effectively ignored
the ADEA's legislative history, was contrary to the views of the
Department of Justice and the EEOC, and reversed well
established precedent set forth by the federal courts and
applicable federal agencies. °
In addition to overruling Betts, the OWBPA deleted the
"subterfuge" language in section 4(f)(2) 51 of the ADEA and replaced
it with the current provision,52 including the express codification of

ADEA employee benefit plan does not violate the ADEA "so long as the plan is
not a method of discriminating in other, non-fringe-benefit aspects of the
employment relationship." Id. at 177. Better stated, it was not a violation of
the ADEA for an employer to discriminate against an older worker in terms of
employee benefits so long as the benefit plan was not a vehicle for
discrimination in other prohibited ways, such as salary, hiring or firing. Id.
48. Id. at 182.
For More than [twenty] years, older workers have been protected from
age discrimination not only in hiring, firing, promotions, demotions, and
compensation, but also in the critical area of employee benefits.
However, on June 23, 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court in the Betts
decision essentially eliminated the applicability of the Federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act to employee benefits. As a result of
the Court's decision, employers can now freely discriminate against
older workers in such vital employee benefits as health insurance,
disability and life insurance.
136 CONG. REC. E2770, E2770 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Roybal).
49. Betts, 492 U.S. at 182; see also 135 CONG. REC. E2880, E2880 (daily
ed. Aug. 4, 1989) (statement of Rep. Clay) (stating that Justice Kennedy
ignored ADEA's legislative history, and did not give credence to the "plain
language of the statute," and instead, held that, "the only way that an
employer could violate (4)(f)(2) of the ADEA-the exemption for bona fide
employee benefit plans that are not a subterfuge to evade the purpose of the
law-was if the employer also discriminated in some other nonfringe benefit
aspect of the employment relationship.").
50. 135 CONG. REC. S9948, S9950 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of
Sen. Metzenbaum). "This is the first time since Congress passed the ADEA
that employers have been permitted to discriminate in providing employee
benefits. The Betts decision reverse[d] 20 years of settled law, including
regulations supported by the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan and Bush
administrations, and the [decisions of Five Circuit Courts]." Id.
51. See, e.g., Erie County, 220 F.3d at 203-04; (citing Betts, 492 U.S. at
165) (noting that at the time of the Betts decision, section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA
reflected the old subterfuge language and did not reflect the amended
language added by the OWBPA, i.e. section 4(f)(2) provided "that it was not
unlawful for an employer 'to observe the terms of ...any bonafide employee
benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA").
52. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (2000).
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the equal benefit or equal cost standard in section 4(f)(2)(B)(i).5 '
The equal benefit or equal cost standard provides that an
employer may lawfully reduce employee benefits, provided that 1)
the benefits available to older workers are no less favorable than
those the employer provides to younger workers, and 2) the
employer spends the same amount of money, or incurs the same
cost, on behalf of older workers as on behalf of younger workers in
providing such benefits."4
In 1969, "the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a threeparagraph regulation interpreting section 4(f)(2)" of the ADEA as
originally legislated." The DOL interpretation provided that:
A retirement, pension or insurance plan will be considered in
compliance with the statute where the actual amount of payment
made, or cost incurred, in behalf of an older worker is equal to that
made or incurred in behalf of a younger worker, even though the
older worker may thereby receive a lesser amount of pension or
retirement benefits, or insurance coverage.56
This "equal benefit or equal cost" standard explicitly carved
out an exception from ADEA liability for employers providing
benefits to employees. 7 In 1979, the enforcement authority over
the ADEA was transferred to the EEOC, where the EEOC
subsequently redesignated the DOL regulations interpreting
section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA to 29 C.F.R. section 1625.10."8 Courts
have applied 29 C.F.R. section 1625.10 holding that "an employer
could avail itself of the section 4(f)(2) safe harbor if it provided
either equal benefits to older and younger workers or incurred
equal costs on behalf of each." 9
Today, the EEOC adheres to section 4(f)(2)(B)(i) and 29 C.F.R.
section 1625.10, and includes the equal benefit or equal cost safe
harbor in its Compliance Manual. ° The EEOC policy provides
53. OWBPA § 103; 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (2000).

55. 135 CONG. REC. S9948, S9948-49 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of
Sen. Pryor).

56. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(2001) (applying different terms but
maintaining the basic premise of the DOL interpretation).
57. 135 CONG. REC. S9948, S9949 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of
Sen. Pryor).
58. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 203 n.5 (citing S. REP. No. 101-263, at 8-12
(1990)).
59. Id. at 203; see also Auerbach v. Bd. of Ed. of the Harborfields Cent.
Sch. Dist. of Greenlawn, 136 F.3d 104, 111 (2nd Cir. 1998) (articulating that

"for a plan to comply with the ADEA, the employer had to show that it either
provided the same benefits to older employees or incurred the same costs on
behalf of older employees[," and providing that "[ujnder this 'equal benefit or
equal cost' principle, so long as the employer could provide a cost-based
justification for the disparate benefits, the plan would not be a 'subterfuge').
60. See EEOC MANUAL, supra note 27, at 7212 5807.
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that the equal benefit or equal cost safe harbor allows an employer
to provide lesser benefits to older employees so long as that
employer can show that the cost of the benefits for older workers
was at least equal to the cost of the benefits of younger
employees. 6' Thus, if an employer's cost of providing benefits to an
older worker exceeds the cost of benefits provided to a younger
worker, the employer is permitted to provide smaller benefits to
older workers, so long as the employer incurs the same cost for all
workers.62
On October 3, 2000, the EEOC broadened its view regarding
the applicability of the ADEA and the equal benefit or equal cost
safe harbor to encompass retirees."3 For example, the EEOC's
Compliance Manual issued on October 3, 2000, stated that:'
Benefits will not be equal.., where a plan sets a specific, age-based
cutoff for the length of time employees can receive payments ....
Moreover, benefits will not be equal where a plan reduces or
eliminates benefits based on a criterion that is explicitly defined (in
whole or in part) by age.
The incorporation of this policy into the EEOC Compliance
Manual was a direct result of the Erie County decision."' The
EEOC, however, has not consistently held this view. Rather, the
EEOC has interpreted the ADEA as inapplicable to retirees."

61. Id.
62. Id. at 7212 5807-3 (stating that the employer must justify the reason
for offering different benefits to older and younger employees); see also Erie
County Retirees Assoc. v. County of Erie, Penn., 91 F. Supp. 2d 860, 865 (W.D.
Pa. 1999) (providing that "the purpose behind § 4(f)(2) [of the ADEA was] to
permit age-based reductions in employee benefit plans where such reductions
are justified by significant cost considerations").
63. See, e.g. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission at 16-17, Erie County Retirees Assoc. v. County of Erie, Penn.,
220 F.3d 193 (3rd Cir. 2000) (No. 99-3877) [hereinafter EEOC Amicus Brief].
64. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 27 at 7212 5807-3.
65. See PLAN SPONSOR.COM, supra note 8 (explaining that the court's
holding in Erie County was "incorporated in to the EEOC's compliance

manual.").
66. Substantive Regulations on Health Insurance Benefits for Employees
Age 65 to 69, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,434 (June 7, 1983).

The issue has also been presented concerning an employer's
obligations to employees aged sixty-five through sixty-nine who are at
present not actively employed but who are receiving health care benefits
by virtue of extended coverage under an employer's health plan. In such
a situation, the Commission will look to all the facts and circumstances
to determine whether an employment situation still exists. Employees
engaged in seasonal work who retain seniority rights and other indicia
of a continuing employment relationship will in all likelihood fall within
the meaning and spirit of Section 4(g). On the other hand, employees
gratuitously provided extended coverage after the termination of
employment status were not intended to fall within the scope of Section
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For example, in 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 198267 ("TEFRA"). TEFRA amended
the ADEA to include section 4(g) which provided that "employees
aged sixty-five through sixty-nine shall be entitled to group health
coverage offered to employees under age sixty-five under the same
terms and conditions.""8 Section 4(g) provided stricter guidelines
than the equal benefit or equal cost safe harbor subsequently
codified by the OWBPA, but nonetheless was an "outgrowth" of the
equal benefit or equal cost standard.69
The EEOC published interim regulations interpreting section
4(g). 0 Pursuant to its interpretation of the section, the EEOC
explicitly stated that "retirees are not embraced by the term71
'employee' for the purposes of section 4(g) of the ADEA."
However, Congress repealed section 4(g) in 1989.2 Although
section 4(g) was repealed in 1989, the EEOC has, prior to 2000,
interpreted the ADEA as inapplicable to retirees.73 Thus, former
Section 4(g) is important for this discussion because it illustrates
that prior to Erie County, the EEOC interpreted the ADEA one
way, but subsequently changed its view, effectively flip-flopping on
whether the ADEA indeed applied to retirees.
In 2000, it seemed that the EEOC's view changed, as
illustrated through its interpretation of the ADEA in an amicus

4(g). Their status would be most like that of a retiree. Retirees are not
embraced by the term employee and are, therefore, not covered by the

literal wording of the new section.
Id.
67. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
68. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA") § 4(g)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(g)); see generally Substantive Regulations on
Health Insurance Benefits for Employees Age 65 to 69, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,434
(June 7, 1983). Section 4(g) was subsequently repealed in 1989. See Pub. L.

No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2233 (1989).
69. Brief for the County of Erie, Penn. at 12, County of Erie, Penn.,
Petitioner v. Erie County Retirees Assoc. et. al, Respondents (No. 00-906).
70. Substantive Regulations on Health Insurance Benefits for Employees
Age 65 to 69, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,434 (June 7, 1983).
71. Substantive Regulations on Health Insurance Benefits for Employees
Age 65 to 69, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,434 (June 7, 1983).

72. Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2233 (1989).
73. Erie County, 91 F.Supp. 2d at 877.
[F]rom 1982 to 1989, the protections afforded by § 4(f)(2) were
superseded and supplanted by a more specific and exacting form of
protection under § 4(g) ... it is apparent that the EEOC considered

retirees to be outside the scope of protection afforded by Section 4(g).
Thus, we can logically infer that the EEOC likewise viewed retirees as
outside the scope of protection afforded by § 4(f)(2), at least where the

subject of health benefits is concerned.

20021

Age DiscriminationMay DiscourageRetiree Benefits

brief filed with the Third Circuit.74 The EEOC explicitly provided
that "there is every reason to believe" that Congress intended the
protections of the ADEA to extend to retirees.8 On August 17,
2001, however, the EEOC changed this position once again by
temporarily abandoning the Erie County decision, and launching a
review of its policy toward the retiree medical plans and the
ADEA.7 1 Such flip-flopping on whether the ADEA indeed applies
to retirees indicates the EEOC's inconsistent views on what
Congress actually intended by enacting the ADEA, which arguably
reduces the credibility and reliability of the EEOC's interpretation
of the ADEA, and its applicability to retiree medical plans.

I. THE ERIE COUNTY DECISION
In Erie County, Medicare-eligible retirees, i.e. retirees age
sixty-five and over, initiated a class action lawsuit against the
County of Erie, Pennsylvania ("County") contending that the
County's retiree medical program violated the ADEA's prohibition
against discriminating in the terms and condition of employment
based on age.77 The retiree class argued that because of their age
and eligibility for Medicare, employers treated them adversely
with respect to their health insurance coverage as compared to
those retirees under the age of sixty-five, i.e. non-Medicare-eligible
retirees, who received superior health coverage. 71
For clarity, one must first understand the holding rendered
by the Third Circuit in Erie County. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, in reversing the district court, flatly discarded Congress'
intent underlying the ADEA, 8 as provided in the OWBPA's
legislative history."
The Court of Appeals held that the
congressional intent was not controlling.8' Instead, the court
adopted the EEOC's argument, as provided in its amicus brief,
which asserted that the ADEA applied to changes in benefits
affecting retirees, and concluded that the ADEA "protected class"
consisted of "individuals" and that the term "individuals" was
broad enough to encompass "retirees."" Therefore, the court held
74. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 210.
75. EEOC Amicus Brief, supra note 63, at 16-17.
76. EEOC Press Release, supra note 36.
77. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 197-98; see also Donald P. Carleen, Retiree
Medical Plans and ADEA, N.Y. J., Oct. 20, 2000, Employee Benefits Law, at 3

(stating that the case was of first impression in the Third Circuit at the time).
78. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 197-98.
79. Id. at 208-10 (finding that nothing "in the language of the ADEA"
indicated that Members' statements that the ADEA was inapplicable to
retirees were "accurate," thereby finding them not to be "persuasive").
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 210
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that the retiree class, as "individuals," established a claim of age
discrimination under section 4(a)(1) of the ADEA88 (providing that
it is "unlawful for an employer" to "discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or
84
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.")
The court based its conclusion on the finding that Medicare
eligibility "follow[s] ineluctably upon attaining age sixty-five," i.e.,
"Medicare status is a direct proxy for age."85 The court also
concluded that the benefit plan that Medicare-eligible retirees
were enrolled in provided less benefits than those provided to nonMedicare-eligible retirees.86
Thus, since the court considered
Medicare eligibility an age-based factor, and the retiree class fell
within the broad definition of "individuals" as provided in ADEA,
the court ruled that discriminatorily providing inferior benefits to
the retiree class covered under the plan was a violation of section
4(a)(1) of the ADEA."7 The Third Circuit provided, however, that
the County could avoid liability under the ADEA if it satisfied the
equal benefit or equal cost safe harbor as provided in section
4(f)(2)(B)(i)."8
The facts of Erie County are as follows. In 1972, the County
implemented a retiree medical benefits program for all of its
retired employees. 9 Under the program, the County created
"three main coverage groups:" 1) active employees, 2) Medicareeligible retirees, and 3) non-Medicare-eligible retirees.90 "Each
group had separate but similar traditional indemnity health
coverage." 1 In 1992, faced with increasing health costs, the
County began contemplating cost-cutting measures, and opted to
limit the eligibility for retiree medical health coverage."

83.

29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)(1998).

84.

Erie County, 220 F.3d at 208.

85.

Id. at 211. (quoting Erie County, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 867).

86. Id. at 213 (concluding that "the County has treated appellants
differently than other retirees with respect to their 'compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of... age[,]' [and therefore,
the retiree class] established a claim of age discrimination under 29 U.S.C. §
623(a)(1)," unless the County could satisfy any of the ADEA's safe harbors).
87. Id. at 210-12. "In sum, we conclude that members of the plaintiff
class are 'individuals' who have been treated differently by their 'employer'

with respect to [their] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment." Id. at 210.
88. Id. at 216. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(i9(2)(B)(i)).

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 196.
Id.
Id.
Id. The County first decided to amend its retiree medical plan to limit

eligibility for retiree medical benefits only to employees hired before January

24, 1992. Id. The County further limited benefits by limiting eligibility for
benefits to, inter alia, employees who retired by fifty-five years of age with
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In 1997, the County's health care provider, Highmark Blue
Cross/Blue Shield ("Highmark"), raised its annual health
insurance premiums by an average of forty-eight percent.93 In
response, the County restructured its retiree medical benefits
program. 94 The restructured program no longer provided the
traditional indemnity plan to all retirees, but instead, provided
HMO group health coverage to Medicare-eligible retirees. 9'
Additionally, the newly structured retiree medical program still
provided the traditional indemnity plan to non-Medicare-eligible
retirees, but also allowed them the choice to remain in the
indemnity plan or enroll in a PSO health plan.96 The HMO group
health plan, called SecurityBlue, 97 required a referral from a
primary care physician for all treatment.9 The PSO health plan,
which combined the features of an HMO and a traditional
indemnity plan-called SelectBlue' 9-differed from SecurityBlue
in that it did not require any referrals from a primary care
physician for treatment. ' 00

The Medicare-eligible retiree class contended that the
SecurityBlue plan provided inferior health coverage by comparing
the level and type of benefits available to the Medicare-eligible
retirees and the non-Medicare-eligible retirees, i.e. the argument
was based on the fact that as an HMO, SecurityBlue was less
flexible and restricted its members' medical options as compared
to SelectBlue and the traditional indemnity coverage previously
available to them, and thus, provided inferior benefits.''
Therefore, plaintiffs contended that SecurityBlue violated the
ADEA by treating the Medicare-eligible retirees worse than those
retirees under age sixty-five."2

twenty years of service. Id. at 196-97.
93. Id. at 197.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Erie County, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 863.
98. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 197.
99. Erie County, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 863.
100. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 197. The County required that all Medicareeligible retirees enroll in the SecurityBlue plan or forfeit benefits. Id.
101. Id. at 197-98. (finding that the court must address the applicability of
the ADEA when an employer offers its Medicare-eligible retirees health
insurance coverage allegedly inferior to the coverage offered to retired
employees not eligible for Medicare).
102. Id. The retirees contended that "the County violated the ADEA by
treating... the plaintiff class less favorably on account of their age, as
compared to (1) active employees and (2) retirees under age sixty-five[,]" but
later limited their complaint to the comparison between the plaintiffs class
and retirees under age sixty-five. Id. at 198. The court noted that even
though individuals can qualify for Medicare based on factors other than age,
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The County, however, raised an affirmative defense,
contending that it satisfied the equal benefit or equal cost safe
harbor"'3 as codified in the ADEA by the OWBPA.' °4 The plaintiffs,
on the other hand, asserted that because the County provided
inferior benefits, i.e. unequal benefits, and because the expense for
providing health coverage to the retiree class was less than the
expense incurred for coverage for younger retirees, the County
could not rely on the equal benefit or equal cost safe harbor."5
Accordingly, the court found that because the benefits offered to
those who were eligible for Medicare based on age were less
generous than the benefits offered to non-Medicare-eligible
retirees, the retiree medical program violated the ADEA.0 6
II. "RETIREES" ARE NOT "INDIVIDUALS" FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE
ADEA
Contrary to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the district
court 0 7 initially held that the ADEA did not apply to retirees. The

district court relied on the OWBPA legislative history which
consistently provided that the ADEA does not apply to retirees,
nonetheless, Medicare-eligible retirees. 0 8
The district court
e.g. disability, in this case, all of the eligible individuals so qualified "solely" on
the basis of their age. Id. at 211. Thus, "the gravamen of [the] lawsuit [was]
that the County violated the ADEA by discriminatorily placing.., the
plaintiff class into SecurityBlue[,]" which provided inferior benefits, "on the
basis of their having attained age sixty-five." Id. at 198; see also Erie County,
91 F. Supp. 2d at 865-66 (noting that Medicare eligibility is not solely based
upon age; rather, disabled individuals are eligible for Medicare benefits as
well, however, in this case the individuals eligible for Medicare were eligible
on account of age, and not due to any disability).
103.29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a)(1) (2001).
[B]enefit levels for older workers may be reduced to the extent necessary
to achieve approximate equivalency in cost for older and younger
workers. A benefit plan will be considered in compliance with the
statute where the actual amount of payment made, or cost incurred, in
behalf of an older worker is equal to that made or incurred in behalf of a
younger worker, even though the older worker may thereby receive a
lesser amount of benefits or insurance coverage.
Id.
104. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 199. "The County [also] argued that it based
its decision to place Medicare-eligible retirees in SecurityBlue not on age but
on three age-neutral factors: (1) active versus inactive employment status, (2)
cost, and (3) availability of plans." Id. (citing Erie County, 91 F. Supp. 2d at
865).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 213.
107. See generally Erie County, 91 F. Supp. 2d 860.
108. Id. at 880. Cf. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 208-09. (stating that
"[o]bviously, all members of the plaintiff class are 'individuals[,]'" and holding
that "the ordinary meaning of the term 'employee benefit' should be
understood to encompass health coverage and other benefits which a retired
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concluded that based on the presence of the term "older worker" in
the equal benefit or equal cost safe harbor, 0 9 Congress intended
the equal benefit or equal cost standard to apply only to benefits
for active (or current) employees."' The Third Circuit, however,
disagreed."'
The Third Circuit recognized "that there [were] statements in
the legislative history of the OWBPA [that] indicate[d] that certain
members of Congress viewed the ADEA as inapplicable to retirees
except when a retiree's benefits are 'discriminatorily structured
prior to retirement.""' The court, however, provided that "nothing
in the language of the ADEA" leads to the conclusion that such
statements were "accurate" and therefore, did not find them to be
"persuasive.'1 3 Accordingly, the court noted that they were "left
with a rather difficult task of statutory interpretation[,]" 4 and
concluded that "[wihile the legislative history may provide
assistance in resolving ambiguity, the language of the statute
must guide [them] in the first instance.""' In reversing the district
court's application of ADEA, the Third Circuit interpreted the
term "individual" as provided in section 4(a)(1) of the ADEA"16 to
include the term "employees," that in turn encompassed
"retirees.""' The Third Circuit justified this conclusion by relying
heavily on the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation of the
term "employee" as provided in section 704(a) of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.""

person receives from his or her former employer" (emphasis added)).
109. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
110. Erie County, 91 F.Supp. 2d at 869-70
111. See Erie County, 220 F.3d at 210 (concluding that the term
"individual" as provided in section 4(a)(1) of the ADEA encompassed
"retirees").
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 208.
115. Id.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000) (providing that "[ilt shall be unlawful for
an employer... [to] discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age").
117. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 210 (holding that the decision rendered by
the Supreme Court in Robinson v. Shell Oil and Co., 519 U.S. 337, 339 (1997)
supported the court's conclusion that the term "individual" indeed
encompassed a "retiree").
118. See id. at 209 (articulating that "Robinson addressed the
applicability of the anti-retaliation provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to actions taken against former employees.").
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A. Reliance on Robinson Was Erroneous:The Term "Individual"
Does Not Cover "Retirees
The Third Circuit concluded that "individuals" were "retirees"
for the purposes of the ADEA by relying heavily on Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co.." ' In Robinson, the Supreme Court held that the
term "employee," as used in section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,"' included "former employees." 2' The Supreme
Court articulated that "[a]t first blush, the term 'employee' as
provided in section 704(a) would seem to refer to those having an
existing employment relationship with an employer in question."2 '
The Supreme Court concluded, however, that "[t]his initial
impression does not withstand scrutiny"' 3 because the term
"employed" injected in the definition of "employee" "could just as
easily be construed to mean was employed." 124 Based on this
reasoning, the Court interpreted that section 704(a) of Title VII
covered "former employees." 25
In Erie County, the Third Circuit noted that the term
"employee" as provided in the ADEA was identical to the definition
provided in Title VII, i.e. "an individual employed by an
employer." 2 ' Based on this definition, the court concluded that for
119. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).

121. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341-43.

In Robinson, the plaintiff was

discharged from his employment. Id. at 339. After being discharged, the
plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC contending that he was discharged
on the basis of race. Id. After his discharge and pending further action
pursuant to his claim, the plaintiff sought new employment whereupon his
former employer gave him a negative reference. Id. Plaintiff contended that
his former employer retaliated against him for having filed the EEOC charge.
Id. The plaintiff brought suit under Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 that prohibits retaliatory discrimination against any
employee or applicant for filing under Title VII. Id. The issue was whether
"employee" also meant "former employee." Id. The Supreme Court concluded
that the term employee as used in § 704(a) of Title VII, was ambiguous. Id. at
341. The Court relied heavily on the EEOC's argument which provided that
"[the] exclusion of former employees from the protection of § 704(a) would
undermine the effectiveness of Title VII by allowing the threat of
postemployment retaliation to deter victims of discrimination from
complaining to the EEOC, and would provide a perverse incentive for
employers to fire employees who might bring Title VII claims." Id. at 346.
Thus, the Court stated that "[ilt
being more consistent with the broader
context of Title VII and the primary purpose of § 704(a) .... that former
employees are included" under the term employee, and therefore, "within §
704(a)'s coverage." Id. at 346.
122. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 341-42 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 341-46.
126. See Erie County, 220 F.3d at 209 (noting that the term employee, as
defined in § 701(f) of Title VII for the purposes of § 704(a) of Title VII, was 'an
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the purposes of the ADEA, an "individual" was considered an
"employee" employed by any employer.'27 The term "individual,"
however, is not defined anywhere in the ADEA.128 The court went
on to conclude that "Robinson indicate[d] that an employer's
adverse actions taken against someone who has ceased actively
working for that employer, [i.e., a "former employee"], may
constitute discrimination against an 'employee. ,1 29 Thus, the Third
Circuit opined that because an "individual" was considered an
"employee," and the term "employee" covered "former employees"'
(a "retiree" is considered a "former employee"),' it followed that
"retirees" fell within the definition of "employee" under the ADEA,
therefore falling under the broad term "individual."1 2
B. The Third Circuit Overlooked the Entire Reasoning in Robinson;
Robinson Is Distinguishable
Although the Erie County court relied heavily on Robinson,
the Third Circuit failed to follow Robinson's entire decision. For
example, in Robinson, the Supreme Court, unlike the Third
Circuit, found that relying on the broad term "individual,"
"provide[d] no insight" in defining the term "employee."'
For
example, at the end of the Robinson decision, the Supreme Court
concluded that, "the use of the term 'individual' in section 704(a),
as well as in section 703(a), [of Title VII], provide[d] no meaningful
assistance 34
in resolving [the] case," i.e., interpreting the term
"employee."'
The Court recognized that the term "individual"
was "broader" than the term "employee," which could "facially" be

individual employed by an employer' - the same definition present in the
ADEA")
127. Id. at 209. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) provides that the term employee
means "an individual employed by any employer").

128. Id. at 208-09.
129. Id. at 209
130. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 343.

131. Nowhere in the Third Circuit's opinion did the Court define the term
"former employee." However, the term "former" means "coming before in time,
of, relating to, or occurring in the past." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 459 (9th ed. 1999). The term "employee" means "one employed by

another." Id. at 408. The term "former employee" can be construed to mean
one employed by another in the past. The term "retired" is defined as
"withdrawn from one's position or occupation," and a "retiree" is defined as "a
person who has retired form a working or professional career." Id. at 1000.
Thus, a "former employee" can be considered a "retiree"-one who has

withdrawn from employment, or one that was employed in the past.
132. See Erie County, 220 F.3d at 209.
133. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added).

134. Id. (finding that "the use of the term 'individual' in § 704(a), as well
as in § 703(a)" provided no meaningful assistance in interpreting the meaning
of the term employee).
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interpreted to "cover former employees."'' However, the Court
concluded that, "[relying on] [t]he term 'individual'. .. [did] not
seem designed to capture 'former employees,' as distinct from
current employees, and its use provide[d] no insight into whether
the term 'employees' is limited only to current employees." 36
Robinson is distinguishable from the Erie County decision in
that the Erie County court relied on the term "individual,"rather
than the term "employee," to reach the conclusion that "retirees"
were "former employees."'37 For example, in Robinson, the
Supreme Court focused primarily on the term "employee," and
looked to other sections of Title VII to reach the conclusion that
the term "employee" was ambiguous.' Furthermore, according to
the Supreme Court, the term could be construed to cover "former
employees."'39 In Erie County, however, the Third Circuit did not
focus primarily on the term "employee," but rather on the term
"individual." " 0 The Third Circuit did not look to other sections of
the ADEA to aid the court in its interpretation,14 ' but instead
reasoned that if an "individual" was an "employee," and the term
"employee" covered a "former employee," an "individual" must also
be considered a "former employee."'
However, as articulated in
Robinson, relying on the term "individual" is not "designed to
capture former employees."'
Therefore, relying on the term
"individual" as opposed to "employee," "provides no insight"4 4 as to
whether "retirees," i.e. "former employees," are considered
"individuals" for the purposes of the ADEA. Thus, although
Robinson stands for the proposition that "employees" may be
considered "former employees," 5 the court should not rely on
Robinson for the proposition the term "individual" is designed to
capture "former employees," and in turn, "retirees." Certainly
Robinson is distinguishable from the Erie County decision, and
therefore, not applicable to the Erie County facts.
C. The Third CircuitFailed to Identify the "Temporal Qualifiers"

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 208-09.
138. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341-43.

139. Id.
140. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 208-09.
141. See infra notes 146-63 (discussing that the Third Circuit should have

looked to temporal qualifiers as stated in the Robinson decision and in other
sections the ADEA, thereby aiding the court in its interpretation of section
4(a)(1) of the ADEA and the term individual).

142. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 209.
143. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345.

144. Id.
145. Id. at 341-43.
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in Section 4 of the ADEA
In Erie County, the Third Circuit again overlooked the
Supreme Court's entire interpretation in Robinson, and instead,
focused only on a portion of the Supreme Court's decision in order
to reach their result.'46 For example, the Robinson Court, holding
that the term "employee" covered a "former employee" for the
purposes of Title VII, cited Walters v. Metropolitan Educational
Enterprises, Inc..
Walters provided a contrary interpretation of
the term "employee," as provided in Title VII, to mean "persons
with whom an employer has an existing employment
relationship."1'
In Walters, the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the
term "employee" as provided in section 701(b) of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.149 The Walters Court concluded that the
term "employee" was limited to persons with whom an employer
has an existing employment relationship because section 701(b)
included two explicit terms illustrating the intended meaning of
the term.15 These explicit and illustrative terms are known as
"temporal qualifiers."'51 "Temporal qualifiers" are defined as terms
explicitly provided in the language of the statute
that illustrate
2
Congress' intended meaning of specific terms.1
The Robinson Court, while analyzing Walters, noted that
section 701(b) included two significant "temporal qualifiers" that
aided the Walters Court in its interpretation of the term
"employee."'53 For example, section 701(b) provided that the Act
"applies to any employer who 'has fifteen or more employees for
54
each working day in ... the current or preceding calendar year'.1

146. See Erie County, 220 F.3d at 210 (finding that retirees were protected

under the ADEA).
147. 519 U.S. 202 (1997).
148. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 342 n. 2 (quoting Walters v. Metro. Educ.
Enter., Inc., 519 U.S. 202 (1997) where the Supreme Court "held that the term
'employees' [as provided in § 701(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641,
referred to those persons with whom an employer has an existing employment
relationship")(emphasis added).
149. See generally Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enter., Inc., 519 U.S. 202

(1997).
150. Walters, 519 U.S. at 208-09.
151. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341-42.

152. See id. (articulating that temporal qualifiers such as current
employee or former employee would have allowed the Supreme Court to
unambiguously determine the meaning of employee as provided in § 704(a) of

Title VII and citing other statutes that included temporal qualifiers, e.g. 2
U.S.C. § 1301(4)(1994, Supp I), explicitly defining employee to include former

employee and 5 U.S.C. § 1212(a)(1) including "employees, former employees,
and applicants").
153. Id. at 342 n.2.
154. Walters, 519 U.S. at 204 (emphasis added).
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The Robinson 'Court found this "time-frame in which the
employment relationship must exist""5 to be "temporal qualifiers,"
that meant that an "employee" must be a person that was still
working with the employer.156 Unlike Walters, the Robinson Court
found that the section 704(a) had no "temporal qualifiers," and
therefore found nothing to aid the Court in its interpretation of the
term "employee."" 7 Therefore, the Robinson Court found the term
"employee" to be ambiguous, thus enabling the Court to construe
that the term "employee" covered "former employees."
Similar to the Robinson Court's finding that the term
"employee" was ambiguous, the Third Circuit, found the term
"individual" ambiguous." However, Erie County is distinguishable
from Robinson and analogous to Walters in that section 4 of the
ADEA includes a "temporal qualifier" illustrating Congress'
intended meaning of the term "individual" as provided in section
4(a)(1).
To illustrate, section 4(f)(2)(B)(i) provides that "where, for
each benefit or benefit package, the actual amount of payment
made or cost incurred on behalf of an older worker is no less than
that made or incurred on behalf of a younger worker."15' Pursuant
to the Supreme Court, "we do not ...construe statutory phrases in
isolation; we read statutes as a whole."16 ° Therefore, where section
4(a)(1) provides that it is unlawful for an "employer" to
"discriminate
against any individual...because of such
individual's age",6 we must look to section 4(f)(2)(B)(i) which
modifies the term "individual" to only cover "older workers." Thus,
consistent with Walters, the "temporal qualifier" of "older worker"

155. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 342 n.2.
156. Id. at 342.
157. Id. at 341 (stating that "there [was] no temporal qualifier in the
statute [that] would make plain that § 704(a) protect[edl only persons still
employed at the time of the retaliation").

158. See Erie County, 220 F.3d at 208 (looking first to the language of the
statute itself).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (2000) (emphasis added); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.10(a)(1) (2001).

160. United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984). Pursuant to the
Supreme Court, construing § 4(a)(1) in isolation would only be half of the

analysis. The Supreme Court has provided that courts must read the entire
statute in order to adequately interpret its various sections. Id. When
interpreting whether the ADEA applies to retirees as individuals, as provided

in § 4(a)(1), the interpreting court must examine § 4 of the ADEA in its
entirety to determine the ADEA's true applicability. Thus, reading § 4 of the

ADEA in its entirety requires a court to interpret § 4(f)(2)(B)(i), along with §
4(a)(2), (a)(3), and (c)(2) that unambiguously refer to active (or current)
employees.
161. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
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as provided in section 4(f)(2)(B)(i)... helps define the term
"individual" to cover "workers" and not "former employees." Hence,
because "older worker" temporally qualifies the term "individual,"
the term "individual" does not, and should not, include "retirees. " "'
M1I.

THE

ADEA

DOES NOT APPLY TO RETIREES

The author asserts that the district court was correct in
holding that the ADEA does not apply to retirees because the
OWBPA amended the ADEA to only apply to "older workers," and
not to "retirees."'64
Furthermore, although the district court

162. Section 4(a)(2), (a)(3) and (c)(2) can also be construed to include
temporal qualifiers. For example: 1) § 4(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2), provides
that, "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer.., to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's age;" (emphasis added) 2) §
4(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(3), provides that "[ilt shall be unlawful for an
employer ... to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with
this Chapter;" (emphasis added) and 3) § 4(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(c)(2),
provides that, "[i]t shall be unlawful for a labor organization ... [to] fail or
refuse to refer for employment any individual ... which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would... adversely
affect his status as an employee ...
because of such individual's age."
(emphasis added) 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(2), (a)(3), (c)(2)(2000). Reading these
sections in connection with § 4(a)(1) indicates that term individual, which,
according to the Third Circuit covers the term employee cannot, and should
not, be construed to cover former employees, nonetheless retirees. 29 U.S.C. §
623(a)(1)(2000).
163. The Supreme Court in Robinson also stated that when interpreting
the meaning of a term in Title VII, such term does not always have "the same
meaning in all sections" of the Title. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 343-44. Rather,
"each section must be analyzed to determine whether the context gives the
term a further meaning that would resolve the issue in dispute." Id. This
concept is illustrated through Robinson and Walters where the Supreme Court
found two different meanings for the same term: employee. See generally,
Robinson, 519 U.S. 337; Walters, 519 U.S. 202. Thus, since the term employee
in § 704(a) may have a different meaning than the term employee in other
sections of Title VII, the Third Circuit has no justification for explicitly
adopting the Robinson Court's holding that the term employee covers former
employee under the ADEA. Furthermore, if we were to follow Robinson,
stating that each section must be analyzed to determine the context of the
term, we can look to section 4(a)(2), 4(a)(3) and 4(c)(2) of the ADEA which
unambiguously refer to "current employees"-not "former employees"-and
most importantly not to retirees.
29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3),
(c)(2)(2000). Thus, arguably the term employee cannot, and should not, be
interpreted to cover former employees, rather employee refers to current
employees.
164. See Erie County, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 878 n.20. (concluding that because
"Congress deliberately limited § 4(f)(2)(B)(i)" by injecting the term older
worker, this illustrated Congress' "primary intent" for the ADEA to apply to
active employees only).

The John Marshall Law Review

[35:709

stipulated that the retiree class was placed in SecurityBlue
because of age, 65 the court held that the ADEA "clearly was not
intended to apply to retirees like the plaintiff class.""6 Thus, as
supported by the foregoing discussion, the district court's initial
holding and rationale, and Congress' clear and unambiguous
intent as articulated in OWBPA's legislative history, leads to the
conclusion that ADEA does not apply to "retirees."
A. The District Court Determined That the ADEA Does Not Apply
to Retirees
In determining that the ADEA "clearly" did not apply to
retirees, the district court examined the statutory language of the
ADEA, as amended by the OWBPA."7 The court opined that it
must interpret the ADEA "in a manner which best effectuates
Congressional intent and the legislative purpose underlying [the
statutes] adoption."'1 8 Upon statutory construction, the district
court found that the ADEA was unclear as to whether sections
4(a)(1) and 4(f)(B)(2)(i) applied to "retirees" or "older workers."6 '
The ambiguity stemmed from section 4(a)(1) of the Act, which
generally prohibited employers from discriminating against "any

165. Id. 865-68. The district court and the Third Circuit concluded that

the plaintiff class was treated differently because of age. Id. Specifically, the
district court concluded that "it [was] undisputed that the triggering feature
for SecurityBlue coverage was ... eligibility for Medicare Part B Medical
Insurance .... " Id. at 865. Thus, the district court held that eligibility for

Medicare is an age-based factor and therefore the plaintiffs' class made a
"prime facie" showing of age discrimination. Id. at 867-68. The district court
noted that "Medicare eligibility and residency within the SecurityBlue service
area are both necessary-i.e., 'but for'-conditions for receiving coverage
under the SecurityBlue plan." Id. at 867. "Plaintiffs' age was a determinative
factor in their placement in the SecurityBlue Plan because, if not for their age,

they would not be placed in that plan." Id. The Third Circuit, agreeing with
the district court, concluded that Medicare eligibility was a direct "proxy for
age," and found that the there was a "but-for causal relationship between
Medicare eligibility ... and placement in SecurityBlue." Erie County, 220

F.3d at 212 n.12.
166. Erie County, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 880.

167. See id. at 872-75 (stating that through examination of the OWBPA's
extensive legislative history, Congress did not intend to extend ADEA
protections to retirees, rather, changes in the statutory language of the
substitute version, which was passed by an overwhelming majority of
Congress, indicated that section 4(f)(2)(B)(i) was to be construed narrowly and
limited to active (or current) workers).
168. Id. at 869 (citing In re Jaritz Indus., Ltd., 151 F.3d 93, 105 (3rd Cir.
1998) (Mansmann, J., concurring).

169. Id. at 869-70 (providing that the terms "individual," "older worker,"
and "younger worker" were not defined in the statute, and therefore, it was
unclear as to whether the retiree class was extended protections under the
statute).
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individual," 7 ° while under section 4(f)(2)(B)(i), however, a limited
exception "to 'older workers' and 'younger workers', terms that,
although undefined in the ADEA, suggest[ed] a more narrow and
precise scope of protection."171 The district court concluded that
because Congress did not inject the term "employee" into section
4(f)(2)(B)(i), which according to Robinson covered former
employees, and, because Congress did not include the broader
term "individual," that it was unclear as to whether the ADEA's
protections reached the retiree class. 17 2 This ambiguity forced the
district court to examine the legislative history of the OWBPA to
determine the Congressional intent and the legislative purpose
underlying these sections. 7 '
The district court found that the legislative history of the
OWBPA indicated that Members of Congress viewed the ADEA as
permitting employers to offer inferior health benefits to Medicareeligible retirees. 74 Furthermore, the district court relied on the
distinction between "individual" and "older worker" to conclude
that "based on the presence" of the term older worker in section
4(f)(2)(B)(i) and statements that "the ADEA was not intended to
apply" to Medicare-eligible retirees, Congress intended the equal
benefit or equal cost standard to apply only with respect to
benefits for active (or current) employees.'7' Therefore, the district
court found that the County should prevail regardless of whether
it could satisfy the equal benefit or equal cost standard because
the ADEA was restricted to protecting "currentemployees."76
170. Id. at 869.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 869-70.
173. Id. at 869.

174. See id. at 874 (articulating that both the Senate and House Floor
Managers "were apparently of the view that employers would not run afoul of
the ADEA by providing disparate health benefits as between their Medicare-

eligible and non-Medicare-eligible retirees").
175. Id. at 878 n. 20.
176. See Erie County, 220 F.3d at 200 (finding that the district court held
that "the County was entitled to judgment regardless of whether [an
employer's] health insurance scheme satisfied the equal benefit or equal cost

standard" because the district court determined that Congress intended the
equal benefit or equal cost standard to apply to active employees only). The

Third Circuit subsequently criticized the district court's decision by asserting
that "the district court simply recognized an additional safe harbor for an
employer [that] treats its Medicare-eligible retirees less favorably with respect
to health benefits than other retirees. . . ." Id. This new safe harbor would not

"require the employer to satisfy the equal benefit or equal cost standard." Id.

The Third Circuit stated that it saw nothing in the language of the ADEA that
would afford employers the ability to treat Medicare-eligible retirees less
favorably. Id. at 210. Thus, the Third Circuit explicitly discarded the
legislative history of the OWBPA, agreed that the ADEA was ambiguous as to
its protection of retirees, and determined that the court's "statutory
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B. The Statutory Language of the Pryor-Hatch-Metzenbaum-Heinz
Substitute
Commentators contend that statements made by the Bill
Managers regarding legislation are considered by the courts to be
the most significant statements expressing Congressional intent. 77'
Furthermore, commentators and the Supreme Court provide that
such statements are considered to be probative evidence
underlying the purpose of a statute. 78 Commentators argue that
statements of Bill Sponsors, similar to statements of the Bill
Managers, should provide probative evidence of the intent
underlying a statute. 9 For example, Professor Ross and Judge
Mikva assert that two categories of statements made by Members
of Congress that are most reliable are: "1) statements [made] by
the sponsors of the legislation or the particular provision at
issue ...and 2) colloquies between the 'major players' concerning
a legislative provision when it appears that the majority of
members are prepared to follow any consensus reached by these
individuals."' 80 The author asserts that statements made by the
OWBPA Bill Sponsors and Bill Managers, along with colloquies
that were subsequently followed by an overwhelming majority of
Congress, i.e. 94 Members in the Senate and 406 in the House of
Representatives, clearly indicated Congress' intent: that the
ADEA does not apply to retirees 8'
construction must guide the court in the first instance." Id. at 208 (citing In re
Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 444 (3rd Cir. 1996)).
177. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGILSTIVE PROCESS 36-37 (Aspen Law & Business
1997); WILLIAM N. ERSKINE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 303 (2000); United Steel

Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 239 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
178. See Justice Stephen Breyer, The 1991 Justice Lester W. Roth Lecture:
On the Uses of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S.CAL. L. REV.
845, 848 (1992) (concluding that to better understand the "context and purpose

of a statute," courts rely heavily on the legislative history); see also Steadman
v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 100 (1981).
179. See Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should
Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes To You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 576 (1992); see
also ERSKINE, JR. ET AL, supra note 177, at 303; Weber, 443 U.S. at 239; Cf.

Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that committee reports and floor statements should not be given
weight in deciding statutory interpretation because they are "increasingly

unreliable evidence of what voting Members of Congress actually had in
mind.").

180. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 177 at 37 (citing Stephen F. Ross, Where
Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes To
You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 576.

181. Cf.Blanchard,489 U.S. at 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). It is
apparent, however, that a majority of Congress, i.e., 94 Senators and 406
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737

Senator Hatch, one of the OWBPA Bill Sponsors and Bill
Managers in the Senate, was the first to articulate that:
Many employers continue health benefits for persons who retire
before they are eligible for Medicare and/or continue certain benefits
that are supplemental to Medicare. This is a positive practice which
helps provide important protections for retirees. This compromise
ensures that the bill will not interfere
with these important benefits
2
that are vital to retirees of all ages.1
Senators Bentsen and Pryor's colloquy, both Bill Sponsors
and Bill Managers, further illustrated that the ADEA does not
apply to retirees by providing:
Mr. BENTSEN: Is it the understanding of the Senator that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act does not apply to retirees?
Mr. PRYOR: The distinguished Senator is correct. The ADEA
applies only to employees and those individuals seeking
employment. However, it does apply to an individual whose
retirement benefits are discriminatorily structured prior to
retirement. 1
Members of the House of Representatives also weighed in on
expressing the applicability of the ADEA, as amended by the
OWBPA.' s For example, Representative Clay, a Bill Sponsor and
Bill Manager in the House reiterated this intent by providing that,
"nothing in the bill would apply the provisions of the ADEA to
5
retirees.""'

Finally, the legislative history articulated the will of the
majority of Congress.. in the "Statement of the Managers" (as
provided by both the Senate and the House of Representatives in
the Congressional Record as "S. 1511 Final Substitute: Statement
of the Managers"):
Many employer-sponsored retiree medical plans provide medical

Representatives,
agreed with Senators Bensten and Pryor and
overwhelmingly supported Congressional intent.
Thus, Justice Scalia's
statements that floor debate only indicates the intent of a small majority of
Congress has no merit.
182. 136 CONG. REC. S13,594, S13,600 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (referencing the compromise to change section
4(f)(2)(B)(i) to include the term "worker" instead of the term "individual").
183. 136 CONG. REC. S13,594, S13,609 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990)
(statements of Sens. Bentsen and Pryor).
184. See 136 CONG. REC. H8614, H8618 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement
of Rep. Clay) (expressing the desired impact of the OWBPA to exclude retirees
from protection).
185. Id.
186. See infra note 198. The OWBPA passed Congress with overwhelming
bipartisan support, thus indicating that a majority of Congress agreed with
the statements articulated by the Bill Sponsors and Bill Managers.
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coverage for, retirees only until the retiree becomes eligible for
Medicare ....
In many of these cases, the value of the medical
benefits that the retiree receives before becoming eligible for
Medicare exceeds the total value of the retiree's Medicare benefits
and the medical benefits that the employer provides after the retiree
attains Medicare
187 eligibility. These practices are not prohibited by
this substitute.
The author asserts that statements made by the OWBPA Bill
Managers and Bill Sponsors provide sufficient justification that
the ADEA does not apply to retirees. 188 Moreover, the statutory
language of a substitute version of the OWBPA and examining the
reasons for those changes, provides substantialjustification for the
conclusion that Members of Congress did not intend for the ADEA
to apply retirees.8 9
At the onset of the OWBPA floor debates, several Members of
Congress had concerns as to whether the OWBPA would
negatively impact retiree medical benefits. 8 °
For example,
Senator Grassley (R-IA) stated that although he supported the
underlying goal of the OWBPA, he did not want the bill to wreak
"havoc in the benefits area.""' The Senator inquired whether
companies that provide health benefits to retirees, but cease
benefits upon Medicare-eligibility, would have any protections
under the bill."2
Such concerns, however, were subsequently
remedied through a compromise version of the OWBPA," 3
introduced by Senators Hatch (R-UT) and Metzenbaum (D-OH),
dubbed the 94 Pryor-Hatch-Metzenbaum-Heinz Substitute ("The

Substitute"). 1

The Substitute was significant (and remedied Senator
Grassley's concerns) because it replaced the term "individual" in
the original version of the OWBPA's section 4(f)(2)(B)(i) of the

187. 136 CONG. REC. S13,594, S13,597 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990)
(statement of the managers).
188. See supra notes 178-87, and accompanying text; see also infra notes
210-13, and accompanying text.
189. Cf. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 208 (providing that the ADEA was
ambiguous as to whether the term "individual" encompassed "retirees," and
articulating that in order to resolve the "ambiguity, the language of the
statute must guide us in the first instance").
190. 136 CONG. REC. S13,296, S13,297-98 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Grassley).
191. Id.
192. Id. "Ifthe bill is enacted would such a company be in violation of the
law? Is that the sponsors intention? If not, what provision in the bill protects
employers in such circumstances?" Id.
193. 136 CONG. REC. S13,594, S13,607 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Grassley).
194. 136 CONG. REC. S13,594, S13,594, s13,597(daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
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ADEA with the term "worker."195 Such a change in The Substitute
indicated that Congress intended section 4(f)(2)(B)(i) of the ADEA
to have a limited scope. The district court came to the same
conclusion.'96 For example, the district court agreed that Senator
Grassley's concerns were "subsequently addressed"'97 when a
majority of Congress 98 decided to use the term "worker" in section
4(f)(2)(B)(i) of the ADEA rather than the term "individual." 99 The
district court concluded that the decision to change the "more
generic" term "individual" to a much "more specific" term
"worker," indicated Congress' intent for section 4(f)(2)(B)(i) to be
209
narrow in scope.
The Third Circuit expressly disagreed that construing the
term "worker" was exceedingly limited in its meaning than the
broader term "individual," stating that "it was unclear 20 1 as to why
Congress made this change or what significance the change was
intended to have." °'
The Third Circuit reasoned only that
"Congress wished to have congruity between the language of

195. See 136 CONG. REC. S13,594, S13,599 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990)
(summary of the Pryor-Hatch-Metzenbaum-Heinz Substitute) (changing "the

word 'individual' in section 4(f)(2)(B) back to 'worker").
196. See Erie County, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 869-70, 878 n.20 (finding
Congress' deliberate decision to use the term "worker" in § 4(f)(2)(B)(i) of the
ADEA, rather than the term "individual" indicated that Congress intended the
section's limited scope).
197. Id. at 873 (providing that Senator Grassely's concerns were
apparently "addressed during the course of proceedings held on September 24,
1990" when the Senate voted to pass the Substitute, "which represented a
compromise version as agreed to by the various managers," i.e. Senators
Metzenbaum, Pryor, Hatch, and Heinz, and that the final intent of the
Substitute, provided in the "Statement of the Managers," illustrated that
"[Congress] sought to clarify and eliminate [any] existing controversy
concerning the reduction of retiree medical benefits at Medicare-eligible age").
198. The final Roll Call vote of the OWBPA was ninety-four yeas to one
nay in the Senate, and 406 yeas to seventeen nays in the House of
Representatives. Pub. L. No. 101-433, Bill Summary & Status for the 101st
Congress, available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited August 20, 2002).
Such a lopsided bipartisan vote count illustrates that the Substitute of the
OWBPA was overwhelmingly accepted by Members of Congress. Id.
199. Erie County, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 873 (citing 136 CONG. REC. S25,355
(daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (summary of the Pryor-Hatch-Metzenbaum-Heinz
Substitute)).
200. Id. at 869-70 (finding that "[section] 4(f)(2)(B)(i) refers to 'older
workers' and 'younger workers,' terms that, although undefined in the ADEA,
suggest a more narrow and precise scope of protection").
201. The statements made by the OWBPA Bill Sponsors and Bill
Managers illustrated Congress' clear and unambiguous intent: changing the
term "individual" to "worker" indicated that the ADEA was not intended to
apply to retirees. See supra notes 178-87, and accompanying text; see also
infra notes 210-13, and accompanying text.
202. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 215.
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section 4(f)(2)(B)(i) and the language of the equal benefit or equal
cost regulation," 20 3 as provided under 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10." °
Although the Third Circuit acknowledged that the term "older
worker" in section 4(f)(2)(B)(i) of the ADEA "complicated" its
conclusion that the ADEA applied to retirees,"' the court
nonetheless opined that Congress "did not adopt the word 'worker'
with the specific intention of excluding retirees.""'
How did the court reach such a conclusion? The reasoning
that the court offered was that "it makes good sense" to find that
Congress intended for the ADEA to apply to retirees, and that "the
rule strikes a fair middle ground between the interests of the
employer and the interests of older retirees . . .,, adding that "the
rule avoids overburdening employers to such an extent that they
will be tempted to throw up their hands and eliminate benefits for
all retirees."2 °8 However, in the words of the Third Circuit such
reasoning is "a rather thin reed upon which to base a
conclusion. 2 °9
Thus, it seems evident that the final intent of Congress was
not only to permit employers to reduce benefits for Medicareeligible retirees, but most importantly, to reinforce the concept
that the ADEA protections do not extend to retirees.210
Additionally, such legislative history provides strong justification
that the practice of reducing retiree medical benefits once an
individual reaches Medicare-eligibility is not a violation of the
law. 21' The intent of Congress is clear: the ADEA does not apply to

203. Id.
204. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a)(1)(2001).
205. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 215 (providing that "[wie acknowledge that
our analysis is complicated by the presence of the term 'older worker' in
section 623(f)(2)(B)(i)").
206. Id.
207. Id. at 216.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 215.
210. Such statements prompted the district court to once again conclude
that not only was this narrow intent illustrated through the decision among a
majority of Congress to include the term "worker" instead of "individual," but
the clear and unambiguous directives from individual Members calls for a
narrow construction of the ADEA with regards to its application to retirees.
Erie County, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 869-70. Therefore, pursuant to the OWBPA

floor debates, such legislative history provides strong justification for the
conclusion that the ADEA does not apply to retirees. Thus, through
examining how Congress changed the language of section 4(f)(2)(B)(i) we, like
the district court, can conclude that the term "worker" was intended only to

apply to active (or current) "employees."
211. See supra note 198 (showing clear support, through overwhelming
bipartisan votes, for the concept of reducing retiree health benefits upon
achieving Medicare eligible status).
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retirees.212
C. The Third Circuit'sReliance on the EEOC Was Incorrect
In addition to the court's reliance on Robinson,13 the Third
Circuit relied heavily on the EEOC's interpretation of the
OWBPA's legislative history and the EEOC's interpretation of the
ADEA, rather than Congress' interpretation and Congressional
intent underlying the statute. 14 For example, the court followed
the EEOC which explicitly provided:
It is inconceivable that Congress would in the same breath expressly
prohibit discrimination in employee benefits, yet allow employers to
discriminatorily deny or limit post-employment benefits to former
employees at or after their retirement, although they had earned
those employee benefits through years of service with the
employer.219
The court agreed with the EEOC's broad statement. 16 However,
Congress intended something entirely different than what the
EEOC interpreted, and as discussed, there was substantial
legislative history indicating the opposite intent.2 7
It is well established that a federal agency's central function
is to interpret its enabling legislation. 2" Frequently, "[algencies,
like the courts, are required to defer to the plain meaning rule,
and failure of any agency to do so is reversible by a court."21 9 In
situations of an ambiguous statute, the Supreme Court has held
that "federal courts must defer to interpretation given to the
statute by that agency to which Congress has delegated the power
Where Congressional intent is clear,
to apply the statute."2 0
however, the Supreme Court has stated that the court and the
federal agency must defer to Congress' intent rather than the
federal agency.2 21

212. Thus, as provided, the clear statements advanced by the Bill
Managers and Bill Sponsors should not have been discarded by the Third

Circuit.
213. See supra notes 119-32, and accompanying text (discussing the
rational behind the Court's decision regarding Title VII in Robinson).
214. See Erie County, 220 F.3d at 210 (finding the EEOC's argument to be
"persuasive").
215. Id.; EEOC Amicus Brief, supra note 63, at 16-17.
216. Id. (holding that "members of the plaintiff class are 'individuals' who
have been treated differently by their 'employer' with respect to [their]

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment").
217. See supra notes 177-87 & 210-12, and accompanying text (revealing
the underlying Congressional intent behind the OWBPA).
218. MIKvA & LANE, supra note 177, at 46.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-
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For example, in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource
Defense Council,22 the Supreme Court concluded that the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977223 ("Amendments") were ambiguous
as to the meaning of the term "stationary source." 24 The Court
subsequently relied on the Environmental Protection Agency's
("EPA") definition of the term, in lieu of Congress, stating that the
legislative history of the Amendments did not squarely address the
meaning of the term, nor did Congress act "with this narrow issue
in mind."225 The Supreme Court articulated, however that "if a
court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question
at issue, that is the end of the matter, and that intention is the law
which must be given effect."22 6 The Court stated that "on issues of
statutory construction, courts must reject administrative
constructions which are contrary to clear Congressional intent." 7
43 (1984) (applying a two-step test when reviewing an ambiguous statute and
an agency's construction of that statute, and concluding that "when Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue ... that is the end of the
matter.") (emphasis added).
222. In Chevron, the Supreme Court observed that the relevant amended
part of the Clean Air Act did "not explicitly define what Congress envisioned
as a 'stationary source,' to which the permit program, provided in section
172(b)(6) of the Clean Air Act, should apply." Id. Thus, the Court concluded
that the statute was ambiguous as to the meaning of the term. Id. The Court
ultimately relied on the EPA's definition of term because the Court did not
find the legislative history "illuminating." Id. at 861-62. Furthermore, the
court found the remarks in the legislative history Chevron relied upon "were
obviously not made with this narrow issue in mind and they cannot be said to
demonstrate a Congressional desire .... Id. at 862.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (2000).
224. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841-42 (examining 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6)
(1994)).
225. Id. at 858 (emphasis added). "Based on our examination of the
legislative history, we agree with the Court of Appeals that it is
unilluminating. The general remarks pointed to by respondents 'were
obviously not made with this narrow issue in mind and they cannot be said to
demonstrate a Congressional desire .. " Id. at 862 (citing Jewel Ridge Coal
Corp. v. Mineworkers, 325 U.S. 161, 168-69 (1945).
226. Id. at 843 n.9.
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
Id. at 842-43.
227. Id. at 843 n.9 (citing FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117-118
(1978); FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745-746 (1973);
Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S.
278, 291 (1965); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965); Social
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Like Chevron, the Third Circuit found that the ADEA, as
amended by OWBPA, was ambiguous. 228 However, unlike
history, 23
Chevron,229 through analyzing the OWBPA's legislative
one can find that Congress "squarely addressed" whether the
ADEA applied to retirees, thus resolving any ambiguity.2 31 For
example, in the OWBPA's legislative history, the statements made
by the Bill Managers and Bill Sponsors 2. indicated that Congress
indeed "had the narrow issue" that the ADEA does not apply to
retirees "in mind."22" Thus, following Chevron, such statements
demonstrated a Congressional desire that the ADEA should not
apply to retirees. Therefore, such a clear intent trumped the
EEOC's interpretation, thereby indicating that the court should
have deferred to Congress rather than the EEOC.
Thus, reliance on the EEOC was inconsistent with the clear
intent of Congress, and therefore, incorrect. The Third Circuit
explained that legislative history was not persuasive and that
further statutory construction was required. Yet, at the same
time, followed the EEOC's inconsistent interpretation of the intent
As stated, reliance on a federal agency's
of Congress.
of
a
statute, in lieu of clear guidance from Congress,
interpretation
goes against established precedent. 24 Thus, it follows that the
Third Circuit erroneously discarded the statements made in the
legislative history of OWBPA, and furthermore, incorrectly relied
on the EEOC because Congress clearly expressed that the ADEA
does not apply to retirees.

Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946); Burnet v. Chicago
Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 16 (1932); Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 331, 342
(1896)).
228. See Erie County, 220 F.3d at 208-09 (finding that the ADEA was
ambiguous).
229. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862. (finding "that the legislative history as
a whole was silent on the precise issue" the Court faced, i.e. the meaning of
the term "stationary source").
230. See supra notes 177-87 & 210-12, and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., supra note 198.
232. See supra notes 177-87 & 210-12, and accompanying text.
233. 136 CONG. REC. S13,594, S13,609 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990)
(statements of Sens. Bentsen and Pryor).
Mr. BENTSEN. Is it the understanding of the Senator that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act does not apply to retirees?
Mr. PRYOR: The distinguished Senator is correct. The ADEA applies
only to employees and those individuals seeking employment. However,
it does apply to an individual whose retirement benefits are
discriminatorily structured prior to retirement.
Id (emphasis added).
234. See supra notes 218-227 and accompanying text.
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COST SAFE HARBOR

It is well established that the cost of providing health benefits
increases with age." 5 Thus, the DOL (EEOC) created a separate
equal benefit or equal cost safe harbor provision. 236 The equal
benefit or equal cost safe harbor was intended to provide flexibility
for employers in the provision of health benefits.'
Under the
equal benefit or equal cost safe harbor, an employer could satisfy
either 1) an equal benefit test of the safe harbor, or 2) a separate
equal cost prong of the safe harbor.238 The following discussion
examines the principles associated with the equal benefit or equal
cost safe harbor, explores the district court's and the Third
Circuit's application of these principles, and argues that the Erie
County decision as a whole will result in the elimination of retiree
medical programs.
A. The DOL and EEOC Explain the Equal Benefit or Equal Cost

Safe Harbor
On May 25, 1979, two months prior to the EEOC taking
jurisdiction over ADEA, the DOL published a comprehensive
Interpretative Bulletin explaining the requirements of Section
4(f)(2).239 The underlying intent of the Interpretative Bulletin was

235. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 27 at 917213 5810
A principal objective of the ADEA was to encourage the hiring and
retention of older workers. Congress recognized that the cost of
providing certain benefits to older workers is greater than the cost of
providing those same benefits to younger workers and that those greater
costs would create a disincentive to hire older workers. It crafted the
equal cost defense to eliminate the disincentive.
Id.; see also 136 CONG. REC. H8614, H8617-18 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990)
(explanation of S. 1511) (explaining that in order to cope with increased health
insurance costs, employers must be afforded "flexibility" in order to encourage
the provision of benefits).
236. See 135 CONG. REC. S9948, S9949 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement
of Sen. Pryor) (providing that Congress intended to create a safe harbor that
would encourage employers to provide health benefits to its employees, and
furthermore, encourage employers to hire older workers).
237. Congress recognized that the effect of requiring employers to provide
all workers with the same benefits may "discourag[e] employers from hiring
older workers because some types of benefits, [e.g. health insurance,] are more
costly to provide for older workers." 136 CONG. REC. H8614, H8617 (daily ed.
Oct. 2, 1990) (explanation of S. 1511) (justifying that the equal benefit or equal
cost safe harbor strikes a balance of "fairness" for both employers and
employees).
238. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 27, at IT 7212 5807, 7213 5810; see also
Erie County, 220 F.3d at 215-17 (3rd Cir. 2000); 136 CONG. REC. H8614,
H8617-18 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Clay); 136 CONG. REC.
S13,236, S13,242-43 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1990) (summary of OWBPA).
239. See Interpretative Bulletin on Employee Benefit Plans, 44 Fed. Reg.
30,648 (May 25, 1979) (discussing the requirements of 4(f)(2)); see also
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to explain the equal benefit or equal cost principles.2 40
The
Interpretative Bulletin explicitly "permitted employers to take into
account various benefits provided by the federal government in
determining their benefit obligations of older employees."24 '
According to the DOL, "an employer was permitted... to offset
health care benefits provided by Medicare in determining its own
responsibilities .''
Furthermore, "employers [were permitted to]
either 'carve-out' those benefits provided [through] Medicare or to
take advantage of Medicare availability through the use of a
'supplemental' approach." 3 Under the carve-out approach,2 44 an
employer was permitted to take Medicare into account (i.e.
discount the Medicare-provided
health care benefits) in
determining its cost of providing health benefits to eligible
employees.2 45 An employer taking advantage of the supplemental
option 246 was permitted to estimate the cost of the Medicareprovided benefits and subsequently obtain supplemental health
care coverage to provide additional benefits not provided under
Medicare. 7 The DOL provided that under either approach, the

Substantive Regulations on Health Insurance Benefits for Employees Age 65
to 69, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,434 (June 7, 1983); Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978,
43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (May 9, 1978); Executive Order 12144, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,193
(June 26, 1979).
240. See Interpretative Bulletin on Employee Benefit Plans, 44 Fed. Reg.
30,648, 30,648 (May 25, 1979); see also Substantive Regulations on Health
Insurance Benefits for Employees Age 65 to 69, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,434 (June 7,
1983).
241. Substantive Regulations on Health Insurance Benefits for Employees
Age 65 to 69, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,434 (June 7, 1983).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Erie County, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 876 n.16.
"Carve-out" health plans refer to plans whereby, for employees ages
sixty-five or older, the employer "carves out" from its own health
insurance plan, or directly offsets, those benefits actually paid for by
Medicare. Under this approach, Medicare assumes primary
responsibility for health care expenses and the employer's regular plan
pays only for those expenses it insures against which are not actually
paid for by Medicare.
Id.
245. Interpretative Bulletin on Employee Benefit Plans, 44 Fed. Reg.
30,648, 30653-54 (May 25, 1979); see also Withdrawal of Proposed Rule, 53
Fed. Reg. 27,360 (July 20, 1988)
246. See Erie County, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 876 n.17 (stating that "[m]edicaresupplement plans are separate health insurance plans for employees ages
sixty-five or older which attempt to anticipate the benefits that will be paid
under Medicare and then supplement the employee with benefits which
Medicare is not anticipated to pay.")
247. Interpretative Bulletin on Employee Benefit Plans, 44 Fed. Reg.
30,648, 30,654 (May 25, 1979); see also Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,789 (July 15, 1988).
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combination of Medicare and employer provided health care
benefits would be expected to provide benefits comparable to those
provided to younger employees at a cost traditionally less than the
cost for same amount of benefits provided to younger employees.248
Once the EEOC assumed jurisdiction in July 1979, the
Commission initially preserved the principles provided by the
DOL." 9 The EEOC subsequently launched a complete review of all
interpretations issued by the DOL under the ADEA, and
redesignated the DOL regulations and Interpretive Bulletin in
1981.2 ° The redesignated regulations promulgated by the EEOC
revised the Medicare offset approaches, and explicitly permitted
the practice of integrating employer-provided benefits with
Medicare, provided the "employer-provided and governmentprovided benefits" given to older workers were not less than the
benefits provided to younger workers. 5' The Senate subsequently
approved of the practice of taking Medicare into account, 212 and the
EEOC continues to permit integration of retiree medical plans
with Medicare.2"3
Thus far, this discussion of the equal benefit or equal cost safe
harbor has revolved around "older and younger workers." It was
not until the Third Circuit handed down the Erie County
decision, explicitly following the EEOC,25' that ADEA protections
were extended to retirees.256 Neither Congress, the DOL,25 8 nor

248. Interpretative Bulletin on Employee Benefit Plans, 44 Fed. Reg.
30,648, 30,653-54.
249. See generally Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807
(May 9, 1978); Executive Order 12144, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,193 (June 26, 1979);

Request for Comments, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,626 (March 27, 1992); Withdrawal of
Proposed Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 27,360, 27,360 (July 20, 1988); Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,789, 26790 (July 15, 1988).

250. Final Interpretations: Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 46
Fed. Reg. 47,724 (Sept. 29, 1981); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10 (2001).

251. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(e)(2001).
252. Id.
253. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 27 at

7214 5816 (Rescinded).

254. See Erie County, 220 F.3d at 216.
255. See EEOC Amicus Brief, supra note 63, at 17 (construing that the

term "individual" in section 4(a)(1) of the ADEA encompassed "retirees," and
therefore concluding that ADEA protections must be provided to retirees as
well as active employees).
256. See Erie County, 220 F.3d at 210 (finding the EEOC argument, as
provided in its (the EEOC's) amicus brief, "to be persuasive").
257. See supra notes 177-88 & 190-216, and accompanying text.

258. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120 (1969) (redesignated at 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10
(2001); see generally Interpretative Bulletin on Employee Benefit Plans, 44

Fed. Reg. 30,648 (May 25, 1979); Substantive Regulations on Health
Insurance Benefits for Employees Age 65 to 69, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,434 (June 7,
1983).
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the EEOC (prior to the Erie County decision)25' intended such an
unprecedented application. Since the Supreme Court recently
denied writ of certiorari, 6 ° the Erie County decision is controlling,
at least in the Third Circuit. 261 Thus, all references to older and
younger retirees are synomous with older and younger workers.
B. The Equal Benefit Test and Its Application to Retirees
The Equal Benefit test is just that. It holds that "benefits are
'equal' only [when] they are the same for older and younger
workers in all respects." 62 Currently, the EEOC and controlling
regulations, however, permit employers to reduce benefits, but
such reduced benefits, taken together with Medicare benefits,
must equal benefits provided to younger retirees.2 6 Even after the
EEOC's temporary rescission of its policy regarding retiree
medical programs announced on August 17, 2001,214 the
259. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10 (2001); Substantive Regulations on Health
Insurance Benefits for Employees Age 65 to 69, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,434 (June 7,
1983).
260. See Erie County Retirees Assoc. v. County of Erie, Penn., 532 U.S. at
914.
261. The Erie County decision is controlling in Delaware, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania and the U.S. Virgin Islands. WATSON WYATT INSIDER, EEOC to
Rethink ADEA's Application to Retirees, Sept 2001, available at
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/us/pubs/insider/showarticle.asp?ArticleID=8821
&Component=The+Insider#top (last visited July 18, 2002). Although the
EEOC has temporarily abandoned the Erie County decision as their national
policy, "the agency's shift in position will neither affect court cases [in other
Circuits] nor negate the effects of [the] Erie County [decision]." Id.
262. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 27 at 7212 5807.
EXAMPLE - Employer M maintains a health plan for its retirees. That
plan covers 360 days per year of inpatient care in a hospital for retirees
who are under 65 years of age. Assume that Medicare covers 180 days
per year of inpatient care for individuals who are 65 or above. Based on
this, Employer M's policy provides only 180 days of hospital coverage
per year for retirees who are 65 and over. Employer M has not violated
the ADEA, because all retirees get coverage for 360 days of hospital
care.
Id. at 7214 5816.
263. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a)(1)(2001).
264. See EEOC Press Release, supra note 35 (explaining that the August
17, 2001 EEOC Directive Transmittal rescinded Section IV (B) of the
Compliance Manual Chapter on Employee Benefits, October 3, 2000,
regarding the ADEA and health insurance, and also deleted a related Example
regarding retiree health benefits found in Section II (B) of the same
Compliance Manual Chapter). Although the EEOC has rescinded its policy
regarding the ADEA and retiree medical programs, examining the EEOC's
official policy after its adoption of the Erie County decision in October 2000 is
not only important for our understanding, but important because the EEOC
has not entirely abandoned Erie County's principles. Rather, the EEOC is
merely reviewing its policy. Thus, the EEOC may once again adopt the Erie
County decision after further review. If other circuits adhere to the Erie
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regulations and the EEOC Compliance Manual maintain that
employers may take both employer-provided and Medicareprovided benefits into account when structuring its health benefits
for older retirees.265
1. What Constitutes a Lesser Benefit?
The EEOC provided that if older retirees do not receive an
equal benefit, that is, if an employer provides a type or value of
health benefits to younger retirees that cannot be matched under
Medicare, then the employer would be found to have violated the
ADEA.2
EXAMPLE - Employer M... covers... 360 days per year of
inpatient hospital care[,] ... except Employer M reduces its hospital
coverage for retirees who receive Medicare benefits to 100 days
[(assume that Medicare covers 180 days of hospital coverage)].
Because Medicare recipients will be covered for a total of only 280
days of inpatient care (180 days from Medicare and 100 days from
the employer), they have not received an equal benefit [(because all
other employees will be covered for 360 days)] 267
The regulations also provide that a lesser benefit results if an
older retiree "bear[s] a greater proportion of the total premium
cost (employer-paid and employee-paid) than the younger
[retiree]. "268 Additionally, the DOL has stated, at least informally,
that a shift from an indemnity plan to a network plan, i.e., an
HMO health plan,
is a reduction in benefits, thus producing a
69
lesser benefit.
2. The District Court Applied the Equal Benefit Test on Remand
Pursuant to the laws governing Medicare, employers may
provide lesser benefits to Medicare-eligible retirees."O There are
several situations where "employers that provide health benefits
to retirees reduce or eliminate those benefits when the retirees
reach Medicare-eligibility." 27
According to the Third Circuit,
County holding, it may be more likely that the EEOC will readopt the policy.
265. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(e) (2001).
266. See EEOC MANUAL, supra note 27 at 7414 5816 (rescinded).
267. Id.
268. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(d)(4)(ii) (2001).
269. Telephone Interview with Michael F. Tomasek, partner, Schiff
Hardin & Waite, Chicago, IL (Oct. 30, 2001); see also Higher Premiums, More
Restrictive Coverage for Older Versus Younger Retirees Violates ADEA,
THOMPSON
PUBLISHING
GROUP,
June
2001,
available
at

http://www.thompson.com
270. 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(1)(A)(2000).
271. See EEOC MANUAL, supra note 27 at 7214 5816; see also Karlen v.
City Colleges of Chicago, No. 84C2925, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16576 *1-3
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 1986) (discussing sliding scale for sick leave that is unused
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however, "Medicare status is a direct proxy for age,"272 and
therefore, any reduction or elimination of benefits due to Medicare
status is a violation of the ADEA, unless the employer can justify
its actions under the equal benefit or equal cost safe harbor.273 In
its instructions to the district court on remand, the Third Circuit
stated that the equal benefit test of the safe harbor should first be
applied, and in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(e), the district
court should equally consider both the Medicare-provided and
County-provided benefits that the Medicare-eligible retirees
received.2 4
The district court, following the Third Circuit's instructions
on remand,272 applied the equal benefit prong by analyzing the
benefits provided under SecurityBlue versus benefits provided
27 6
under the traditional indemnity plan and the SelectBlue plan.
The court determined that SecurityBlue provided inferior benefits
based upon three different observations.277
First, the court found that under the traditional indemnity
plan, the retiree class paid their own Medicare Part B premiums,
at $50 per month,7 8 whereas the younger retirees' monthly
contribution was only $12 per month. 9 Looking strictly at what
the retirees contributed, the district court held that the retiree
class was "made to bear a greater proportion of the total cost of
their health insurance premiums than younger retirees," thus

by the retiree); 136 CONG. REC. S13,594, S13,607-08 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Grassley); Mark A. Vogel and Alberto L. Calafell, Issues &
Overview: Most Retiree Health Plans Suspect Under EEOC Interpretation of
ADEA, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, July 2001, available at
http://www.weil.com/wgm/cbyline.nsf/7bdf23df983a38848525678a007d059c/40
1852fc042a330c85256a8400476549?OpenDocument (last visited Aug. 2, 2002).
272. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 211
273. Id. at 211-13.
274. Id. at 216.
275. Erie County Retirees Assoc. v. County of Erie, Penn., 140 F. Supp. 2d
466, 467 (W.D.Pa. 2001).
276. See generally Erie County, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 472-77.
277. Id.; Cf. Gutchen v. Board of Governors, 148 F. Supp. 2d 151, 161
(D.R.I. 2001) (holding that the University, although providing lesser benefits
to individuals over age sixty-five than those under age sixty-five, complied
with the equal benefit or equal cost safe harbor of the ADEA because the
University reduced benefits to the extent necessary to equalize the cost of
providing benefits to older retirees and younger retirees).
278. As of January 1, 2001, "Medicare Part B premiums... , as of
January 1, 2001, were $50 per month." Erie County, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
279. Id. at 472 (examining the retiree class' "argument that SecurityBlue
[was] a lesser benefit than the traditional indemnity plan because
[SecurityBlue] require[d] the [retiree class] to continue paying their Medicare
Part B premiums ... while [the indemnity plan only] required enrollees to
make a contribution of only $12 per month.").
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constituting a violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(d)(4)(ii)(2001).2 8 0

Likewise, the court found that under the SelectBlue plan, the
retiree class paid the $50 premiums, whereas the younger retirees
paid $0 premium costs, thus creating a violation of the
regulations.281
Second, the court held that "SecurityBlue [was] a lesser
benefit than SelectBlue"28 2 because SecurityBlue restricted the
retiree class exclusively to a service provider network under the
HMO coverage, while SelectBlue gave younger retirees a choice
283
between the HMO coverage or traditional indemnity coverage.
Third, the district court held that SecurityBlue provided a
lesser benefit than SelectBlue 2' because the retiree class had to
pay a $10 co-payment for prescription drugs and were limited to a
formulary, while younger retirees had only a $2 prescription-drug
co-payment limitation to specified drugs in both plans. 85 The
court held that restricting drug coverage based on a formulary was
not, in and of itself, discriminatory. 286 But forcing older retirees to
bear a greater proportion of the total cost for drug coverage,"

280. Id. 472-74.

281. Id. at 476. (finding that "[rIequiring older employees to contribute a
portion of voluntary benefit plan premiums while requiring no such
contribution from younger employees [was] expressly prohibited" under 29
C.F.R. § 1625.10(d)(4)(ii)(B)(2001)).
282. The district court did not hold that SecurityBlue was a lesser benefit
than the traditional indemnity plan when it compared the provision of actual
benefits under each plan. Id. at 474. Instead, the court found that the retiree
class' "preference for the traditional indemnity plan's mechanism of insuring
medical services [i.e., benefits,] [was] a subjective preference" because
"benefit[s] of either plan is largely in the eye of the beholder." Id. The court
articulated that "[w]hile [the retiree class] may prefer the traditional
indemnity plan for its greater choice of service providers, other retirees are
likely to prefer SecurityBlue for its low co-payments or other unique attributes
such as coverage for eye examinations and dental visits." Id.
283. Erie County, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
284. Similar to the district court's conclusion that SecurityBlue was a
lesser benefit than the traditional indemnity plan when it compared the
provision of actual benefits under each plan, the court held "that
SecurityBlue's formulary did not render it a lesser benefit than the traditional
indemnity plan." Id. at 477. Specifically, the Third Circuit concluded that
similar to its (the court) findings that "the traditional indemnity plan's
mechanism of insuring medical services," i.e., benefits, was "subjective," the
court held that "[tihe greater choice afforded by the traditional indemnity
plan" through its prescription drug benefit "does not," in and of itself,
"objectively render the plan a greater benefit than SecurityBlue because the
value of this aspect in this context [was] ...subjective." Id. at 474-75.
285. Id. at 477.
286. Id.
287. See id. (concluding that 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(d)(4)(ii)(B) was violated
because an employer cannot require retirees to pay a greater proportion of the
total cost for the prescription drug coverage violated).
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along with restricting the formulary, resulted in inferior benefits
for older retirees.2
C. The Equal Cost Test and Its Application to Retirees
According to the EEOC, "an employer that spends the same
amount of money, or incurs the same cost, on behalf of older
[retirees] as on behalf of younger [retirees] may... provide certain
fringe benefits to older [retirees] in smaller amounts or for shorter
time periods than it provides to younger [retirees] .,,29'

In order to

290
satisfy the equal cost defense, an employer must show that:

1) benefits become more expensive with increasing age 291

... ;

2) the benefit is part of a bona fide employee benefit plan292
3) the plan requires lower benefits 291 ...

...

;

4) The actual amount of payment made or cost incurred on behalf of
an older worker is no less than that made or incurred on behalf of a
younger worker 294

•

5) The benefit levels for older workers are reduced only to the extent
necessary to achieve approximate equivalency in cost for older and
younger workers.

295

In other words, employers providing lesser benefits to older
retirees may avoid ADEA liability by showing that it spends the
same amount for benefits for older and younger retirees, and
furthermore, that such reductions in benefits for older retirees are
limited to an amount which equals the costs incurred by younger
retirees.296

As stated, the Third Circuit directed the lower court to apply
the equal benefit or equal cost test to see whether the County
satisfied its requirements.2 " The court subsequently stated that if
288. Id. at 476-77 (finding that "the ability.., to obtain coverage for a
greater number of prescription drugs at a lower cost under SelectBlue renders
the plan a greater benefit than SecurityBlue").
289. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 27 at 917213 5810.
290. Id.
291. Id.

292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. "EXAMPLE - Employer S shows that it pays $4,000 per year for
each of its employees to purchase a package that includes life and health
insurance benefits. Employer S must show how the $4,000 is allocated
between these benefits." Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(d)(1) (2001); GROOM LAW GROUP,
supra note 25 at 3.
297. Erie County, 220 F.3d at 216.
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the County failed the equal benefit test, the district court should
then apply the equal cost test.2 18 Unlike the court's direction
regarding the application of the equal benefit test, the Third
Circuit limited the equal cost test by providing that the district
court should only consider the County's cost for providing benefits,
not the cost of Medicare.99
The Third Circuit based its conclusion on a statement
provided by Senator Bensten where he articulated that "[t]he
[equal benefit or equal cost] rule does not require that an older
worker receive the exact same level of a benefit that a younger
worker receives, as long as the employer incurs the same cost in
purchasing the benefit for the older worker as for the younger
worker." °° Upon the Third Circuit's findings and subsequent
directions, "the County conceded that it [could not] meet the equal
cost prong as it was defined by the Third Circuit."'' The County
noted that it spent less on the Medicare-eligible retirees because
government-provided benefits made up the cost of the remainder
of the benefits available to the retiree classy.
The Third Circuit acknowledged that ignoring Medicare costs
would make it difficult for employers to satisfy the equal cost
test. 30 3 In reality, it is virtually impossible to comply with Erie
County's equal cost test.30 4 For example, in 2000, the average
reported cost for individual coverage under a traditional indemnity
plan, as well as an HMO was approximately $2,340 for an active
employee, $3,072 for a non-Medicare-eligible retiree, and $1,656
for a Medicare-eligible retiree (excluding the cost of Medicare).0 5 A
more recent study provides that the cost of a non-Medicare-eligible

298. See id. (providing that in the event the County could not satisfy the
equal benefit prong of the equal benefit or equal cost safe harbor, the County

could avoid liability if the district court found that the County satisfied the
equal cost prong of the test).
299. Id.
300. Id. (quoting 136 CONG. REC. S13,594, S13,609 (daily ed. Sept. 24,
1990) (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
301. Erie County, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 477.

302. Id.
303. See Erie County, 220 F.3d at 216 n.15. (recognizing that the Court's
conclusion may eliminate the ability of an employer to satisfy the equal cost

safe harbor where retiree medical benefit programs are structured in such a
way that Medicare-eligible retirees are placed in a health plan which piggybacks off of Medicare and non-Medicare-eligible retirees placed in a plan

which resembles, for example, a health plan offered to active employees).
304. See Vogel & Calafell, supra note 273.
305. See TOWERS PERRIN MONITOR, Employers Encounter Surging Health
Care Costs, Issue 220, Jan. 2000, at 1-2, available at http://www.towers.com/

towers-publications/publications/Monitor/monOOOl.htm (last visited Aug. 20,
2002) [hereinafter TOWERS PERRIN].
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retiree was $5,537, compared to $2,319 for a Medicare-eligible.3 6
That is a considerable disparity in cost between the non-Medicareeligible retiree and the Medicare-eligible retiree.
This
considerable difference in cost, coupled with the Third Circuit's
ruling that the cost of Medicare cannot be taken into account,
indicates that an employer would never be able to satisfy the equali.
cost test.3 7
Experts contend that in response to such an onerous test, an
employer will likely choose either to terminate the retiree medical
program for all retirees, or to limit benefits available to nonMedicare-eligible retirees by reducing their costs to equal the cost
of the Medicare-eligible retirees. °8
For example, instead of
providing health benefits totaling $5,537 for a non-Medicareeligible retiree, an employer may opt to reduce those benefits to
total $2,319 in order to meet the equal cost test under the ADEA.
Such a reduction in benefits for non-Medicare-eligible retirees will
negatively impact this class of retirees.3 9 Instead of providing
lesser benefits to older retirees due to increased cost because of
age, employers may provide lesser benefits to non-Medicareeligible retirees, and still be able to comply with the equal cost

306. William M. Mercer, Inc., Testimony Before the Subcomm. on
Employer-Employee Relations Committee on Education and the Workforce,
House of Representatives, 107th Cong., 4 (Nov. 1, 2001) (statement of Mr. Chip
Kerby, consulting attorney and principal, Washington Resource Group of
William M. Mercer, Incorporated) [hereinafter Mercer Testimony] (citing
William M. Mercer, Mercer/Foster Higgins National Survey of EmployerSponsored Health Plans, 2001) available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/
hearings/107th/eer/retireell010l/kerby.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2002).
307. See Vogel and Calafell, supra note 273.
308. See, e.g., WIMBERLY LAWSON AND SEALE, PLLC, Lower Benefits For

Older Retirees May Violate Age Discrimination Law, available at
http://www.wls-law.com/newsletters/oct2000flowerbenefitsolder.htm
(last
visited Aug. 20, 2002); see also James P. McElligott & Marc E. Purintun,
Retiree Health Plans Need Review After Erie County Age Discrimination
Decision,
MCGUIREWOODS,
LLC,
June
2001,
available
at
http://www.mwbb.com/news-resources/publications/taxation/article614.asp
(last visited August 20, 2002) (stating that "[i]t will be difficult for most retiree
health care plans to meet the 'equal benefit' standard .... ); EEOC,
Information About the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, WISCONSIN
ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL BOARDS, available at http://www.wasb.org/
legislative/adea.html(last visited Aug. 20, 2002); GROOM LAW GROUP, supra
note 25; QUARLES & BRADY, LLP, supra note 30.
309. See generally United States General Accounting Office, Report to the
Chairman, Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, U.S.
Senate, Retiree Health Benefits: Employer-Sponsored Benefits May Be
Vulnerable to Further Erosion, Pub. No. GAO-01-374, 19-24 (May 2001)
[hereinafter GAO Report] available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=dO1374.pdf&directory=/dis
kb/wais/data/gao (last visited August 25, 2002).
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test.310

D. Retiree Medical ProgramsAre Declining: Erie County Will
Contributeto the Erosion of Retiree Medical Benefits
The employer-provided health benefits system is voluntary,31'
and therefore, an employer can lawfully terminate health benefits
or refrain from providing health benefits at all.31 The Supreme
Court has recognized that "[n]othing in ERISA requires employers
to establish employee benefit plans. Nor does ERISA mandate
what kind of benefits employers must provide if they choose to
have such a plan."31 3 Furthermore, the mandatory vesting rules
set forth in ERISA do not apply to welfare benefits. 314 Therefore,
employers are free to eliminate or cut back benefits offered under
their health plans.31 Thus, "the concern that intrusive regulation"
of employer-provided benefits could contribute to the decline in the
provision of benefits "is a realistic one," especially if employers are
subject to increased liability.316
Providing retiree medical benefits to a retiree is also
voluntary.317 ERISA permits employers to eliminate or modify its
310. GAO Testimony II, supra note 11, at 3-6; see also GAO Report, supra
note 309, at 8-10.
311. GAO Report, supra note 309, at 17, Appendix II; see also GAO
Testimony I, supra note 2, at 2.
312. Center v. First Int'l Life Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 94-11596-PBS,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3480 (Dist. Ct. Mass. 1997); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995); see also Sprague v. GMC, 133 F.3d 388
(6th Cir. 1997) (holding that "welfare plans are specifically exempted from
vesting requirements to which pension plans are subject (see 29 U.S.C. §
1051(1))... [therefore, employers 'are generally free under ERISA, for any
reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans.'").
313. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996).
314. ERISA § 201; 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (2000).
315. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.25 (2nd ed. 1999).
"In passing ERISA, Congress determined that requiring employers to vested
employee welfare benefits 'would seriously complicate the administration and
increase the cost of plans whose primary function is to provide retirement
income."' Gable v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 35 F.3d 851, 859 (4th Cir. 1994); see
also H. REP. No. 93-807 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4726 and
H. REP. No. 93-383 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4935.
"Congress accordingly rejected vesting requirements for welfare benefit plans."
Gable, 35 F. 3d. at 859.
316. Brief of Amici Curiae the American Association of Health Plans, Inc.,
American Benefits Council, Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America, and Health Insurance Association
of America in Support of Petitioner at 4, County of Erie, Penn. v. Erie County
Retirees Assoc., 121 S. Ct. 1247 (2001) (No. 00-906) available at
www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents/eric-county-amicus.brief.pdf
(last visited August 25, 2002); see also EEOC Amicus Brief, supra note 64, at
30.
317. GAO Testimony I, supra note 14, at 2; see also EEOC, supra note 308
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retiree medical programs so long as such benefits were not
For example,
promised in the employer's plan documents.31
employers can eliminate retiree medical benefits if the employer
retained the right to change or eliminate the plans, or have
319
To
promised retirees that benefits would not be permanent.
date, employers have been traditionally terminating or modifying
32
these benefits in response to increased health care costs.

(stating that "[an employer is not required to offer health benefits to its
retirees.").
318. EBRI REPORT, supra note 33, at 7; see also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (holding that Curtiss-Wright's
reservation of the right to amend the plan enabled Curtiss-Wright to
terminate its retiree medical program); In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical
Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 58 F.3d 896, 904-05 (3rd Cir. 1995) (holding that
retiree and disability benefits provided by Unisys Corp. were not vested
because Unisys. "reserved the right" to modify or eliminate those benefits
whenever they wanted); Gable v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 35 F.3d 851, 856 (4th
Cir. 1994) (stating that the Plan "specifically reserved the company's right to
modify the plan"); Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 986 F.2d 929, 935 (5th Cir.
1993) (noting that the majority of Circuits "agree that 'ERISA simply does not
prohibit a company from eliminating previously offered benefits that are
neither vested nor accrued"); Sprague v. GMC, 133 F.3d 388, 393 (6th Cir.
1997) (stating "the plan document, including the summary plan descriptions,
effectively reserved a right on GM's part to amend or terminate the plan,"
thus, modification to their retiree medical program was permissible); Frahm v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 137 F.3d 955, 957 (7th Cir.
1998) (finding that when the plan documents reserve the right to change the
terms of the plan, any modification is permissible under the law); Marx v.
Loral Corp., 87 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that "because the Plan
expressly reserved the defendant's right" to modify the Plan's terms, Loral did
not violate the law when it decreased the retiree class' health benefits); Alday
v. Container Corp. of America, 906 F.2d 660, 665-66 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the modifications made to the retiree medical program were permissible
under the law and that any oral or other communications were trumped by the
reservation of the right to modify or terminate clause provided in the plan
document).
319. Supra note 318; see also United States Department of Labor, Pension
and Welfare Benefits Administration, Can the Retiree Health Benefits
Provided By Your Employer Be Cut? (Mar. 1998), available at
http://www.dol.gov/pwba/pubs/briefl.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2002). "Typical
language giving the employer the right [to modify or terminate benefits] might
read: 'The company reserves the right to modify, revoke, suspend, terminate, or
change the program, in whole or in part, at any time.'" Id. (emphasis in
original).
320. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, The Future of Retiree Health
Benefits: Challenges and Options, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on
Employer-Employee Relations Committee on Education and the Workforce,
House of Representatives, 107th Cong., 5 (Nov. 1, 2001) (statement of Patricia
Neuman, Sc.D., Vice President and Director, Medicare Policy Project)
[hereinafter Kaiser Testimony] available at http:///www.kff.org (last visited
Aug. 23, 2002); see also GAO Testimony II, supra note 11 at 1-3; Mercer
Testimony, supra note 306, at 1-5.
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Several surveys conducted prior to January 2000 illustrate
the rapid increase in the cost of providing retiree medical
benefits. 2 ' For example, "[t]he combined cost of coverage for [nonMedicare-eligible retirees] in all plan types jumped by 10%, the
same amount reported by employers for active employees.''
Additionally, the cost of coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees
dramatically increased, on average, by 24%."' Such rising health
costs can place a huge burden on employers. 4 Due to escalating
costs, many employers have articulated that they do not want to
terminate the benefits they provide to their employees and/or
retirees, but sometimes have no choice in the matter."'
Employer-provided retiree medical benefits have been
steadily declining over the past ten years. 326 For example, a
"survey of large employers (most with 1,000 or more employees)
also showed that the percentage [of employers] offering retiree
health benefits" to Medicare-eligible retirees and non-Medicare327
eligible retirees has declined by 18% and 15% respectively.
Another study reveals that coverage has decreased among large
employers for non-Medicare-eligible retirees from 88% in 1991 to
76% in 1999, and from 80% in 1991 to 66% in 1999 for Medicareeligible retirees."
Between 1999 and 2001, employers providing
retiree9 medical benefits to Medicare-eligible retirees declined by
32
10%.
Moreover, employers opting to continue to provide retiree
medical benefits have sought to modify their benefits structure."'
Instead of terminating benefits, employers are using different
321. See generally TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 305.

322. Id.
323. Id.; see also Mercer Testimony, supra note 306, at 3.
324. GAO Report, supra note 309, at 12.
325. See TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 305 (stating that employers must
;consider the financial situation and objectives of the company when making
decisions about health care); see also Mercer Testimony, supra note 306, at 9;
Kaiser Testimony, supra note 320, at 5-6.
326. GAO Testimony I, supra note 14, at 5-6; see also EBRI REPORT, supra
note 33, at 9 (stating that "employers are dropping retirees health benefits.")
(emphasis in orginal).

327. EBRI REPORT, supra note 33, at 9 (citing Frank McArdle et al.,
:Retiree Health Coverage: Recent Trends and Employer Perspectivesand Future
Benefits, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Oct. 1999 and Steve
Coppock & Andrew Zebrak, Finding the Right Fit: Medicare, Prescription
Drugs and Current Coverage Options, Testimony before the U.S. Senate,
Comm. on Finance, Apr. 24, 2001); see also Kaiser Testimony, supra note 320,

at 5(showing a decline in percentage as well).
328. Kaiser Testimony, supra note 320, at 5.
329. Id.
330. See TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 305 (explaining that employers have
created new approaches to health care management); see also GAO Report,
supra note 309, at 8-12.
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approaches to controlling the costs of providing benefits, thus
maintaining the provision of benefits while dealing with the
"
increased health costs.33
' Oftentimes, employers are adopting cost33
sharing programs. Many employers are also restricting eligibility
for retiree medical coverage, e.g. "employers with an age
requirement of 55" with ten years of service. 3 Some other
approaches include adopting a defined contribution plan health
benefit plan,3 consolidating health plans, changing network
delivery models (similar to Erie County) and/or changing or
developing their employee/retiree contribution strategy." Several
of these new approaches, however, could place the employer in a
position where liability is inevitable. 36
The Erie County decision is the main source of this potential
liability facing employers who are attempting to cope with rising
health costs. 337 Such liability could be the proverbial "straw that
broke the camel's back," because many employers who are taking
such cost control approaches have been discouraged from making
any modifications for fear that such modifications and/or
reductions may lead to increased liability. 338 Additionally, because

331. See GAO Report, supra note 309, at 9-10; see also EBRI REPORT,
supra note 33, at 17-19.
332. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 305; see also GAO Report, supra note
309, at 9-10 (explaining that such employers are asking retirees to pay for a
larger share of the coverage costs).
333. EBRI REPORT, supra note 33, at 10; see also GAO Report, supra note
309, at 9-10.
334. See GAO Report, supra note 309, at 10-11. A defined contribution
(DC) type health plan structure has been gaining momentum within the
benefits community. EBRI REPORT, supra note 33, at 17-18. A DC health
plan is essentially identical to a 401(k) plan (except that funds are used to
purchase, among other things, health insurance). Id. at 17. Under a DC
health plan, individual accounts are created on behalf of each employee. Id.
The accounts are funded via employee elective deferrals, employer nonelective
contributions, or a combination of elective deferrals and nonelective
contributions. Id. Contributions to the accounts are then available to the
employee to cover, for example, the cost of health insurance premiums, copayments, or other health related expenses. Id. at 17-18. Each individual
draws down their account as medical expenses are incurred. Id. Any amounts
left over, may be rolled over and used to pay for expenses in subsequent years.
Id.
335. See GAO Report, supra note 309, at 9-12; see also Mercer Testimony,
supra note 306, at 3-4; GAO Testimony II, supra note 11, at 4-5; Kaiser
Testimony, supra note 320, at 6-8; EBRI REPORT, supra note 33, at 17-19.
336. See EBRI REPORT, supra note 33, at 12 (explaining the Third Circuit
Court ruling that a claim is established under the ADEA unless one of two
"safe harbor" provisions is applicable); see also GAO Report, supra note 309, at
16-17; Mercer Testimony, supra note 306, at 8-9.
337. See Mercer Testimony, supra note 306, at 8-9.
338. EBRI REPORT, supra note 33, at 14 (explaining that "the Erie County
decision increases the uncertainty about [employer's] future liability... ").
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many employers sponsor a retiree medical program similar to Erie
County's program, many fear that a new wave of class action
lawsuits may be filed pursuant to Erie County.3 9
As stated, in order to comply with the equal benefit or equal
cost safe harbor, employers will either have to increase the costs
they incur for older retirees, or cut back on benefits already
provided to non-Medicare-eligible retirees. With health care costs
increasing and some employers already terminating retiree health
benefits or restricting eligibility, it is unlikely that employers will
increase the level of health benefits for Medicare-eligible
retirees.34 ° Thus, the only option employers may have, as a result
of Erie County, is to simply eliminate retiree health benefits for all
retirees .3 1 Eliminating retiree medical programs, however, would
not be in the best interests of the public." Contributing to the
elimination of benefits strikes at the heart of the intent of
Congress to provide health benefits," 3 and would leave retirees
unprotected
when their need for health care is probably the
4
4

greatest.3

V. PROPOSAL
The combined effect of rising health costs and potential
liability as a result of the Erie County decision will contribute to
the decline of retiree medical benefits. 45 As stated, such benefits

339. See Thomas S. Gigot, District Court Holds on Remand that Erie
County's Retiree Health Program Flunks ADEA's "Equal Cost or Equal
Benefit" Test By Requiring Medicare-Eligible Retirees to Accept Coverage
through a Medicare HMO While Providing Coverage to Pre-MedicareRetirees
through a Point-of-Service Plan, GROOM LAW GROUP, July 1, 2001, available at

http://www.groom.conmarticles-display.asp?display=61.

340. GAO Report, supra note 309, at 17; see also Mercer Testimony, supra
note 306, at 8-9;
341. Trish Nicholson, Long Goodbye to Benefits?, AARP BULLETIN,
July/August 2001, available at http://www.aarp.org/bulletin/julyaugOl/

goodbye.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2002).
342. QUARLES & BRADY, LLP, supra note 30.

County of Erie, Penn.,

Petitioner v. Erie County Retirees Assoc., et. al., Respondents, No. 00-906,
Oct. Term 2000, Brief for Petitioner at 26-29; see also Brief of Amici Curiae the
Am. Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc., American Benefits Council, Blue Cross Blue

Shield Association, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America,
and Health Insurance Association of America in Support of Petitioner at 4-7,
County of Erie, Penn. v. Erie County Retirees Assoc., 121 S. Ct. 1247 (2001)
(No. 00-906)(discussing regulation of Employee Benefits programs).
343. See supra note 1, at 13,600(statement of Sen. Hatch); see also
QUARLES & BRADY, LLP, supra note 30.
344. GAO Report, supra note 309, at 25; see also GAO Testimony II, supra

note 11, at 6.
345. See, e.g. Erie County, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 878 (stating "[blecause the
cost of such benefits can represent a prohibitively large expense, there is a

very real danger that employers would attempt to comply with the equal
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are arguably one of the most valued benefits an employee can
receive from his or her employer. 6 The Erie County decision may
result in an effect that negatively impacts employees and retirees
alike because such valued benefits may be too difficult to provide,
and therefore, such benefits could be eliminated altogether. 7
Thus, the author proposes that the Erie County decision should be
viewed as an anomalous decision and it should be disregarded by
the courts. Additionally, the Third Circuit's application of the
equal benefit or equal cost safe harbor to retiree medical programs
should be viewed as an erroneous application as well.
Congress should expressly amend ADEA to codify 29 C.F.R. §
1625.10(e), which permits employers to take Medicare into account
when determining if the equal benefit test has been satisfied.3"
Currently, an employer can provide equal benefits to both younger
and older retirees under a Medicare carve-out approach, which is
permissible under 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(e).349 Under a Medicare
carve-out plan, the employer can structure a retiree medical
program to provide benefits to younger retirees that mirrors
Medicare benefits, and provide any additional benefits, both in
type and in value, to younger and older retirees.35 ° Under this
approach, the employer can take advantage of 29 C.F.R. §
1625.10(e) and satisfy the equal benefit prong. By taking the
employer-provided and Medicare-provided benefits into account,

cost/equal benefit rule by simply eliminating (or severely reducing) health
benefits for all retirees."); see also Kaiser Testimony, supra note 320, at 8;
EBRI REPORT, supra note 33, at 14; Gigot, supra note 339.
346. Telephone Interview with Mary Lou Dixon, supra note 12.
347. See generally supra notes 312-44, and accompanying text.
348. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(e)(2001). Allowing employers to take Medicare
provided benefits into account allows the employer to incur lesser costs for
older retirees because the employer is not spending money on the benefits
provided under Medicare to those older retirees. Instead, the employer is
simply spending money on any additional benefits provided to older retirees,
e.g. a prescription drug benefit. Thus, the employer will incur the cost of any
additional benefits provided to younger and older retirees alike, but would
only incur the cost of benefits provided to younger retirees which would be
similar to benefits provided under Medicare. The equal benefit prong of the
safe harbor is relatively easy to satisfy, in that, an employer need only provide
the same benefits to older retirees as provided to younger retirees.
Referencing the Erie County case as an illustration, if the County would have
provided the older retirees with the choice of participating in the POS health
plan, or the choice to remain in the traditional indemnity health plan, the
County would have satisfied the equal benefit test. But the reason the County
structured their retiree medical program to provide such a choice only to
younger retirees was due to rising health costs.
349. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(e)(2001).
350. If an employer structures their retiree medical benefit plan in such a
manner, the employer would satisfy the equal benefit or equal cost safe harbor
as described in 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(e).

The John Marshall Law Review

[35:709

the employer is providing equal benefits to both younger and older
retirees.
For situations where the employer pays for the older retirees
premiums, possible Congressional language could read as follows:
[When a participant in an ERISA-covered plan becomes eligible for
Medicare,] [t]he Employer shall reimburse the full cost of Part B
coverage (including the costs for eligible dependents) on a monthly
basis. In addition, the Employer shall provide the retired
[participant] and eligible dependents with sufficient supplemental
coverage to ensure that the Employer-provided and Governmentprovided benefits together supply the retired employee with benefits
that are equal to the benefits received prior to attaining Medicare
coverage. The term "equal to the benefits" shall be interpreted in a
manner consistent with 29 CFR 1625.10(e). 51
In situations where retirees are required to contribute
towards the cost of health benefits, the following language may be
used:
[When a retired participant becomes eligible for Medicare], the
retired [participant] shall purchase Medicare Part B coverage. At
that time, the Employer shall provide the retired [participant] and
eligible dependents with sufficient supplemental coverage to ensure
that the combination of Employer-provided and Governmentprovided benefits supply the retired [participant] with benefits that
are equal to the benefits the retired employee received prior to
attaining Medicare coverage. The term "equal to the benefits" shall
be interpreted in a manner consistent with 29 CFR 1625.10(e). In
accordance with 29 C.F.R. section 1625.10(d)(4)(ii)(C), retired
[participants] covered by Medicare shall pay no more than the
greater of:
1. The dollar amount paid by pre-Medicare eligible retirees; or
2. The same proportion of the total premium paid by preMedicare eligible retirees, for the coverage described in this
paragraph.
Furthermore, recognizing that health insurance increases
with age, the Third Circuit's equal cost test should be ignored. 53
As stated, it is virtually impossible to comply with the Third

351. The preceeding language was quoted from Steve Kreisberg, Age
Discrimination& Retiree Health Benefits,

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE,

2001 No. 1, available at
http://www.afscme.org/wrkplace/cbrl0l_4.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2002).
COUNTY

AND

MUNICIPAL

EMPLOYEES,

352. See id.

353. See EEOC MANUAL, supra note 27, at 1 7214 5817 (explaining that
"[tihe cost of disability benefits increased with age, and the benefit is part of a
bona fide employee benefit plan that explicitly sets forth the benefit
schedule.").
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Circuit's interpretation of the test."4 Due to rising health costs, it
is unlikely that employers will gross up benefits for older retirees
in order to comply with the equal cost test.358 Instead, employers
may opt to reduce the cost of benefits for younger retirees in an
attempt to comply with this onerous test.356 Thus, when faced with
an issue similar to that raised in Erie County, the courts should
establish a precedent that when applying the equal cost test,
courts should take into account both the cost incurred by the
employer and the cost of Medicare.
In addition, Congress should mandate that when applying the
equal cost test, the cost incurred by the employer should be
coupled with the cost of Medicare. Regulations could be
promulgated pursuant to this mandate to explicitly provide that
both the cost incurred by the employer and the cost of Medicare
must be taken into account under the equal cost test, similar to 29
C.F.R. section 1625.10(e).
The Erie County decision has created tension between two
federal statutes that must be reconciled." 7 In order to reconcile
the tension between ERISA and the ADEA, Congress should enact
legislation, providing that any modification or termination upon
Similar
Medicare-eligibility is permissible under the law.
On July 18,
legislation is now pending in the 107th Congress.
2001, Rep. Petri (R-WI) introduced H.R. 2558, a bill that would
effectively repeal the Erie County decision. 59 H.R. 2558 amends
the ADEA to provide that "[ilt shall not be a violation of" ADEA's
general prohibition on age-based compensation differences "solely
because an ERISA-covered plan alters, reduces or eliminates a
retired participant's benefits when the participant becomes eligible

354. See supra notes 303-10, and accompanying text.

355. Id.
356. Id.
357. As stated, there is established case law providing that under ERISA
an employer is permitted to modify or terminate retiree medical benefits at
any time or for any reason so long as the employer has reserved the right to do
so. Supra note 318. Under the ADEA, however, if an employer modifies or
terminates benefits upon Medicare-eligibility, the employer can be found to
have engaged in a violation as provided under the Erie County decision, i.e.
any modification or termination of benefits based on Medicare-eligibility would
be deemed an age-based distinction, and thus a violation of section 4(a)(1) of
the ADEA. See Erie County, 220 F.3d at 213 (stating "[iun sum, we conclude
that the County has treated [the retiree class] differently than [younger]

retirees with respect to their 'compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
Accordingly, [the retiree class] [has]
employment, because of... age.'
established a claim of age discrimination under 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), unless
any of the ADEA's 'safe harbors' is applicable.").
358. Teacher Voluntary Early Retirement Incentive Act of 2001, H.R.
2558, 107th Cong. § 3(b) (2001).

359. Gigot, supra note 339.
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for Medicare."36
Such a legislative remedy is appropriate, and
should be enacted by a majority of Congress.
Furthermore, the courts should not determine it a violation of
the ADEA when employers modify or terminate benefits upon
Medicare-eligibility. The courts should not only recognize that
modifying or terminating benefits upon Medicare-eligibility is a
relatively common practice among employers,361 but more
importantly, recognize that if employers are not permitted to
modify or terminate benefits upon Medicare-eligibility, employers
are more likely to terminate their retiree medical benefits to all
retirees. Finally, the author proposes that regulations should be
promulgated under 29 C.F.R. §1625.10 to allow employers to
modify or terminate benefits upon Medicare-eligibility.
CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's decision in Erie County is not good law.
The Erie County decision, and the Third Circuit's interpretation of
the ADEA as amended by the OWBPA, renders illegal all retiree
medical benefit plans that reduce or terminate retiree medical
benefits based on Medicare eligibility. If adopted by other courts,
the Erie County decision will negatively impact the voluntary
employer-provided benefits system. As a result, employers may
choose to eliminate retiree medical programs entirely, rather than
risk violating a federal discrimination law. Because there is no
requirement for employers to provide retiree medical benefits,
significant increases in the cost of benefits and administration has
already caused employers to reconsider the scope and availability
of their retiree medical programs.36 An employer with a retiree
medical program that stops at Medicare eligibility would be forced
to consider either reducing benefits for younger retirees, or
eliminating its retiree medical program completely, a result
contrary to public interest and Congressional intent.363

360. Supra note 358.
361. See GAO Testimony II, supra note 11, at 4-5; see also GROOM LAW
GROUP, supra note 25, at 3.
362. See supra notes 321-36 and accompanying text (discussing the

decline in employer-sponsored benefit programs).
363. On March 20, 2002, the parties to Erie County settled the class action
lawsuit. See generally Erie County, 192 F. Supp. 2d 369. Specifically, the

settlement requires the County to reduce benefits provided to non-Medicareeligible retirees by eliminating the PSO plan offered to younger retirees and

limiting the younger retirees to an HMO option, thereby matching the benefits
provided to Medicare-eligible retirees. Furthermore, non-Medicare-eligible

retirees will now be required to pay an HMO premium that equals Medicare
Part B premiums paid by older retirees, i.e. $50 per month. Erie County, 140

F. Supp. 2d at 472. "Medicare Part B premiums, as of January 1, 2001, were
$50 per month." Id. The settlement represents the reality of the negative
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Until the Supreme Court overturns Erie County, the Third
Circuit's decision still provides a retiree class an avenue to claim
ADEA violations. Pursuant to Erie County, the retiree class may
prevail. Such a ruling, however, will sadly result in retirees
winning the battle but ultimately losing the war.

effects of the Erie County decision, and reinforces the position advocated by
the author that the Erie County decision will either result in lesser benefits for
non-Medicare-eligible retirees or the elimination of retiree medical benefits
altogether.

